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Abstract

This thesis attempts to analyze the role that class plays in determining attitudes to gender
among upper middle class Egyptian Copts.
Through fieldwork, it explores the relationship between class, religion and gender in the
lives of upper middle class Christian women. It argues that members of the upper middle class
share a common ‘class culture’ and have access to ‘cosmpolitan capital’ which is constituted
largely in social, cultural, educational and linguistic terms, and which sets them apart from the
broader middle class. A distinctive class culture is produced through gender ideologies
(described using terms such as ‘open minded’ and ‘educated’) that distinguish the upper middle
class from other socio-economic groups which enforce different gender norms. This class culture
and the resources provided by cosmopolitan capital allow upper middle class Coptic women to
selectively reinterpret some elements of mainstream Coptic Orthodox teaching on gender issues,
particularly teachings that are not compatible with the kind of gender norms practiced within the
upper middle class (for example, mixed gender friendships, and romantic relationships prior to
engagement).
These selective reinterpretations of gender norms are not rigorously policed by clerical
authorities; but other areas of contestation between lay elites and church authorities do provoke
reactions, particularly the struggles over divorce rights.
Upper middle class Coptic women use gendered symbols (women’s dress, gender
segregation etc.) to define the boundaries of their class and locate others in a particular class
framework, showing that ideas about gender remain central to contesting and defining group
identities.
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Introduction

This thesis aims to explore the relationship between gender, class and religious identity
among Egyptian Christians. Using ethnographic tools, it will argue that class plays an important
role in the way affluent Christian women interpret gender roles and formulate religious identities.
Based on fieldwork carried out between 0229 and 0200, this thesis will explore how
young Christian women from a particular social demographic – an affluent urban upper middle
class, with a transnational sensibility created through international travel and residence,
consumption of Western popular culture and bilingual education – relate to normative gender
roles, particularly those endorsed by the Coptic Orthodox Church.
It will argue that the impact of narratives about gender roles on the lives of these upper
middle class women is very different from their impact on poorer Christian women. Christian
women who are part of the upper middle class interpret these discourses selectively, in ways
which allow them considerable freedom of choice and independence – for example the freedom
to work outside the home, or to socialize with male friends. They typically describe their choices
as correct interpretations, because they are the product of “education” and being “open-minded”
– both terms rooted in a particular class culture.
Class identity therefore provides young Christian women with the freedom to negotiate
official and popular discourses about gender.0 These young members of the affluent upper
middle class also described religious identities that were not sharply articulated along
denominational lines, in contrast to lower middle class and working class Christians.

0

I use the term discourse/discourses to refer to “the act of talking or writing itself;” “a body of knowledge content;”
“a set of conditions and procedures that regulate how people appropriately may communicate and use that
knowledge.” Following Foucault, this usage aims at linking “communication, knowledge and power.” Routledge
Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology, s.v. "discourse."
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Recent scholarship has described a process in the second half of the twentieth century
through which the Coptic community became centralized around an invigorated Coptic Orthodox
Church.0 This “revival” process and the emphasis on a shared Coptic identity that reinforces it
was a primarily middle class phenomenon. The group of university-educated clerics who led the
process of revival were products of a new Christian professional middle class, and the
solidification of communal identity around the Church itself represented a displacement of a
landed, aristocratic lay elite by this middle-class clergy.
This revival reflected a wider change among the Egyptian middle classes, who became
increasingly economically vulnerable in post-Nasserist Egypt as the social bargain fractured, and
university graduates were no longer guaranteed stable employment for life by the state.0 A
revivified Coptic Church and Coptic community provides a vulnerable Christian middle class
with social networks, opportunities, economic and social support, as well as religious ministry.
The urban upper middle classes, however, have had the power to mould their relationship with
the church as they choose; their existing social and economic capital provides an alternative
source of security to dependence on a communal identity and a strong church.
Drawing on this context of a particular upper middle class culture, this thesis will argue
that young Christian women from this class interpret gender roles and religious identities
differently, drawing on an upper middle class culture that defines class differences partly through
different attitudes to female behavior.

0

Dina El Khawaga, “The Political Dynamics of the Copts: Giving the Community and Active Role,” in Christian
Communities in the Arab Middle East ed. Andrea Pacini (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 09980 040-092.
0
Under Nasser, the authoritarian regime guaranteed Egyptian citizens a minimum standard of living, including the
provision of employment opportunities and government services (such as healthcare and education), in exchange for
political support. One of the main beneficiary groups were lower middle class university graduates, who found
stable jobs for life as part of the rapidly expanding state bureaucracy.
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It will also argue that gender is a neglected category in discussions about Christianity in
Egypt and more specifically about Coptic identity. By showing how gender is policed, it will
reach some conclusions about gender as an important site of identity production.
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Chapter 1: Writing about Christians in Egypt
This chapter explores some of the key issues surrounding research on Egyptian Copts,
such as the paucity of scholarship on the Copts in general and on Coptic women and gender
issues specifically. It also highlights some of the problems inherent in writing about Coptic
communities as an outsider given the problematic history of outsiders’ selective interest in and
deployment of apparent Coptic grievances, and briefly summarizes the methodology of the
fieldwork, and explains why research was not restricted to Coptic Orthodox members.

Coptic women: hiding in plain sight
This thesis was initially prompted by twin observations; firstly, the feeling that women
and gender were critical elements of the debate about Copts and Coptic identity, and secondly,
that analysis and research on these gendered debates, and Coptic women themselves, were
curiously absent from much of the academic literature. Recent studies like Saba Mahmood’s
ethnography of Muslim women in Cairo have presented new models for understanding the
intersection between religion, politics and gender in the region and particularly in Egypt.1
However, academic literature has focused primarily on Muslim women. Mahmood’s research
argues that an Islamic women’s movement, embedded in new spaces and employing new
practices, has been overlooked by many Western feminist scholars who are too preoccupied with
1

Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: the Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject, (Princeton University Press,
0224).
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searching for signs of resistance to patriarchal norms. Other researchers have followed the
opposite approach, explicitly examining Muslim women’s religious practices for strategies of
resistance or proto-feminist leanings.4
Missing from this picture, however, are detailed studies on Coptic women’s experiences,
from either post-colonial or from liberal feminist approaches. Yet Coptic women in Egypt have
also experienced this Islamic awakening as external observers of a changing Islamic identity and
practice which has strongly impacted shared public space and wider Egyptian culture, which they
are part of.2 At the same time, the Coptic Orthodox Church has undergone its own process of
religious and institutional change, usually termed a “revival”; and the implications of this for
gender dynamics have not been fully explored.

Ethnographies of the particular
This absence of knowledge about gender dynamics in Eastern Christianity has a political
dynamic. Over the last several decades, scholarship on the Middle East has become more
reflexive and more sensitive to the problems of knowledge production. Colonialist legacies by
which the region was categorized according to immutable binaries, rendering it an inferior to an
equally essentialized Western counterpart, have been reappraised. Labels like “the West” and
“the Middle East” have been usefully problematized, and many unhelpful paradigms have been
rejected.
4

For example, Sofia Nehaoua, “Prédicatrices de salon à Héliopolis: vers la salafisation de la bourgeoisie du Caire?”
Le Mouvement Social no. 000 (0202): 20-42.
6
Many of my informants discussed these changes with me, and each had a different narrative and emphasis; Dina
described a period of time around ten years ago when she was at university, when she noticed a trend towards
“stricter” religious interpretations among her Muslim friends, which particularly impacted their attitudes towards
mixed-gender gatherings; others such as Christina talked about her parents’ memories of a Cairo in which women
did not veil, in comparison with her own experiences. Irene saw the changes in terms of an eschatological trend of
growing “darkness” that would soon reach an inevitable climax.
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Some essentialized notions retain their power, however. Lila Abu-Lughod has argued that
culture “is the essential tool for making the other”,4 having replaced the nineteenth century
narrative of race as a mechanism for creating “a rigid sense of difference.” She notes that in
many cases, anti-colonial movements have adopted a “reverse Orientalism” in which local
culture is reclaimed and celebrated (“A Gandhian appeal to the greater spirituality of a Hindu
India”),8 and the markers of difference remain unbroken.
In scholarship on the Middle East, religion often functions as a mechanism for creating
this sense of cultural difference. 9 Discussing anthropology, Ranya Abdel Sayed argues that: “In
the case of the ‘Middle East’ Islam has often been used as the qualifying trait that distances the
Other from the West and allows the exoticism necessary to make the area a legitimate subject of
inquiry.”02
Abdel Sayed suggests that one way to avoid the othering process that comes from a focus
on the apparent Islamic nature of the region is to take up Abu-Lughod’s suggestion that
anthropologists look to produce ethnographies of the particular and write against essentializing
notions of culture, in this case by producing work on Egyptian Christians.00 Following Abdel
Sayed, to write about Christians in the Middle East provides a chance to disrupt simplistic
binaries that essentialise the region as “Islamic” and to problematize categories such as “Arab”
“Egyptian” and “Copt.”
4

Lila Abu-Lughod. “Writing Against Culture” in Recapturing Anthropology: Working in the Present, edited by
Richard Fox, (SAR Press, 0990), 137-162.
8

See above.
Focus on Islam evokes previous colonial era (and much older) tropes whereby the inherent disorder and
dysfunction of Islam was accordingly an explanation for the self-evident inferiority of the region.
02
Abdel Sayed, Ranya. “Church Politics: A modernist Approach to the Role of the Coptic Orthodox Church of the
See of Alexandria in Constructing Group Identity Among Egyptian Copts”, (Masters diss., American University in
Cairo, 0220), 2.
9

00

Ibid., 2.
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Analyzing Christianity and gender is a particularly powerful way to disrupt these existing
binaries and essentialised categories. The essentialisation of Islam and the Middle East is
produced through gendered narratives and images such as the veiled, oppressed Muslim woman,
the harem, or the inherently misogynistic Islamic/Arab mind. Studies of gender and Christian
necessarily complicate this simplified picture.

Literature review
Abdel Sayed’s judgment that most works on Copts are either “historical or theologically
apologetical” 00 is still largely accurate. Much of the available research treats categories like “the
Copts” as a single entity, rather than politically and culturally constituted community.
Some studies that do deal with questions of identity and cultural production include ElKhawaga, who outlined a Coptic “renewal”, describing the changes in the structure of the Coptic
community and in the role of the Church.00 This process began as both a product of and reaction
to modernization, in a way that parallels the emergence of Islamist movements.01 This renewal
included a dramatic increase in the number of Copts becoming monks, the reorganization and
centralization of church life, and the “massive institutionalization” 04 by which lay Copts were
brought into the Church structures as deacons or servers, changing the relationship between
Church and believer.

00

Ibid. 0.
El-Khawaga, Dina. “The Political Dynamics of the Copts: Giving the Community and Active Role,” in Christian
Communities in the Arab Middle East. Edited by Andrea Pacini (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 0998): 040-092.
00

01
04

Ibid., 080.
Ibid., 084.
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Paul Sedra’s study looks at how the Coptic community itself has been constituted as an
actor.02 Sedra argues that academic studies often focus on the Copts as a symbol and as an
undifferentiated mass. His article instead describes the community as complex and marked by
class divisions. Within these “class cleavages”, Sedra locates the roots of different and
competing narratives about Coptic identity and the place of Copts in Egypt.
El-Khawaga and Sedra’s research suggests that the Coptic community is a not the
product of primordial ethnic differences, but rather is politically constituted product of an
Egyptian encounter with modernity. If books about women in Egypt fail to capture the Coptic
experience, books about Copts rarely discuss women’s lives in detail. Women are marginalized
in these pages; confined to a single chapter, or the subject of brief observations that remain
under-analyzed. 04
One exception to this is Febe Armanios’s article on gender and Coptic Orthodox society.
In her analysis, she describes various contemporary discourses about women’s expected roles.08
She also discusses the growing popularity of the image of the female “virgin saint”, who was
martyred defending her virginity.
There are a few other works that touch on different aspects of Christian women’s lives,
such as Pieternella Van Doorn-Harder’s unique monograph on Coptic nuns.09 Van DoornHarder analyses the effect of the Coptic revival on nuns, showing that, like monasteries,
convents experienced dramatic changes in the middle of the 02th century (she dates the changes
from the 0922s). She notes some interesting trends, such as the significant numbers of educated
02

Paul Sedra, “Class Cleavages and Ethnic Conflict: Coptic Christian Communities in Modern Egyptian Politics,”
Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 02, 0 (July 0999).
04
Samer Soliman, in his discussion of issues that provoke protests by Copts, talks about sensitivities within
Egyptian religious communities to loosing members and notes that “it seems that when the lost member is a woman
the loss and the triumph are doubled” without exploring this further. Soliman 0229, 014.
08
Febe Armanios, " 'The Virtuous Woman': Images of Gender in Modern Coptic Society." Middle Eastern Studies
08, no. 0 (0220): 002-002.
09
Van Doorn-Harder, Pieternella. Contemporary Coptic Nuns, (University of South Carolina Press; 0994).
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young women taking religious orders, and changes such as the creation of an order of
consecrated deaconesses in 0990.
There is also some useful research on Coptic women by contributors to Between Desert
and City: the Coptic Orthodox Church Today.02 This study builds on Dina El-Khawaga’s work
on the Coptic revival (and includes a chapter by her), exploring various contemporary elements
of Coptic Orthodox life and worship. There are some interesting insights in
Berit Thorbjornsrud’s chapter;00 Thorbjornsrud carried out fieldwork in the El-Salihiyya region
of Greater Cairo, and she has describes the lives of the lower-middle class and working class
Coptic women she encountered. She presents some arguments about the links between the
identity of these women and their public religiosity, and analyses the active involvement of
female servers in Church. She argues that there is a link between a young woman’s activity
serving in church and the respectability of her presence in the public space in the eyes of her
community.00 Although inherently limited – as a case study of a particular demographic – her
research points towards interesting links between official church discourses and the lived
experiences of certain Coptic women.
A dissertation by Ereeny Zaki, looking at poor Coptic women in the El-Salaam city
region of Cairo, provides an interesting contrast to the subject of this thesis – the lives of upper
middle class Coptic women.00
Although these studies of Coptic women provide useful information, some of them adopt
the same flawed approach outlined in Abdel Sayed in her study – a failure to problematize the
02

Nelly Van Doorn-Harder and Kari Vogt, Between Desert and City: the Coptic Orthodox Church Today, (Oslo:
The Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture, 0994).
00
Berit Thorbjornsrud, “Born in the Wrong Age: Coptic Women in a Changing Society” in Between Desert and
City: the Coptic Orthodox Church Today, ed. Nelly Van Doorn-Harder, Kari Vogt (Oslo: The Institute for
Comparative Research in Human Culture, 0994), 024-89.
00
Ibid., 088-9.
00
Ereeny Zaki, Poverty, Gender and Religion: A Reflection on the Status of Coptic Women in Poor Areas, Masters
thesis 0221
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boundedness of the Coptic community. Zaki’s research is problematic for a different reason; the
study looks at the lives of poor Coptic women in a way that is embedded in elite discourses about
feminism, gender and Christianity. She writes that:
The women in my study display characteristics of subordination and lack of
awareness of their interests and their needs. During the fieldwork, there were only
few cases of women who were able to demonstrate high levels of awareness of
some of the injustices against them as women.01

Her study replicates the kind of errors that Mahmood had warned against, whereby a
researcher projects a particular kind of feminist discourse and praxis onto the lives of her
subjects. In this case, the cultural gap in not between a Western researcher and her third world
subjects, but instead between Zaki, an Egyptian Coptic woman, and the Egyptian Coptic
informants she works with. The only difference between the researcher and the subjects in this
study is the socio-economic factor – she is upper middle class and they are members of the urban
poor. It is this class element, and its impact on identity and conceptions of gender roles, that this
thesis hopes to explore.

Defining a Christian upper middle class
This research project was originally envisaged as a study of members of the Coptic
Orthodox community only. This approach follows official Church narratives and much of the
scholarly literature, which present the Coptic Church as “native” and authentically Egyptian. 04

01

Ibid., 90.
. The Coptic Orthodox Church describes itself as the authentic location of Egyptian Christianity through an
unbroken chain of orthodox spiritual authority stretching back to the Apostle Mark’s evangelism in Egypt.
Until the Council of Chalcedon in 140 AD, there was a single church in Egypt; after this theological schism, the
Egyptian church split into two – the Coptic Orthodox Church, and the Greek Orthodox Church. The Coptic church
became the dominant expression of Egyptian Christianity, and today around 92 per cent of Egyptian Christians are
members, but both churches claimed this legacy as the inheritor of orthodoxy and the legacy of St Mark, and both
04

14

Other Christian denominations are not perceived as representing “Egyptianness” with the same
authority.02
Following these narratives, I began my fieldwork with the assumption that a study of
Christianity in Egypt necessarily required a strict focus on Coptic Orthodox believers, as
authentic Egyptian Christianity would surely be located there, and encounters with other
Christian denominations would be as isolated groups of recent converts, engaging in “nonauthentic” religious practices, largely unconnected with the lives of the orthodox faithful, and
unsuitable for an anthropological approach that seeks “native” informants. A quote from
Piernella Van Doorn-Harder’s study on Coptic nuns played over in my mind, from an encounter
at the beginning of her fieldwork when she had encountered the mother superior of a nunnery:
She explained to me the Coptic veneration of the saints and expressed her regrets
that the people of my church, the Protestants, did not venerate the saints…after
she had disappeared several excited nuns rushed into the room; ummina ra’isa,
the mother superior, had spoken to me and in spite of my Protestant background
had approved of me.04

This was the kind of attitude I expected to encounter – one which viewed members of
other Christian denominations (particularly Protestant churches) as problematic and perhaps
“less” Christian. 08

churches to this day maintain a Patriarch of the See of St Mark, with the Byzantine patriarch based in Alexandria
and the Coptic patriarch in Cairo.
02
For example: “The Coptic Orthodox Church can be considered the national Church because of its ancient roots in
Egypt.” Christine Chaillot, The Coptic Orthodox Church (Paris: Inter-Orthodox Dialogue, 0224) 02.
04
Van Doorn-Harder, Contemporary Coptic Nuns, 4.
08
The doctrinal differences between the Coptic Orthodox Church and Protestant denominations are significant and
are considered to be much greater than the differences between Catholic and Orthodox theology (although the
Coptic Orthodox Church is in communion with neither). Some of the major differences are on the nature of Christ,
the origin of the Holy Spirit, the interpretation of the seven sacraments, the refusal of orthodox tradition, the
Protestant belief in salvation through faith alone, failure to venerate the saints, and a lack of belief in intersession.
(Shenouda :0988)
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As is so often the case in fieldwork, I found that my initial categorizations were
inadequate. Following Trotter,09 I planned to explore existing social networks rather than
selecting unconnected individuals, to better situate my findings in an authentic social context.
Situating my fieldwork amongst lay members of the upper-middle class removed me
dramatically, almost totally, from the world of Van Doorn-Harder’s abbess and her wary
distance from Protestantism. I started to find that not only were social networks formed
regardless of denomination, but even the family networks of my informants often cut across
different denominations. Most strikingly, I found that the Coptic Orthodox women I was
speaking to did not follow the rigid lines of denominational segregation in their religious lives,
either.
Taking up an invitation to attend a bible study group from Sylvia, a Coptic Orthodox
friend who knew I was interested in learning more about Christians in Egypt, I was struck by her
participation in a religious community that was not only operated completely outside both formal
and informal Coptic Church networks, but also followed an explicitly non-denominational
approach and included members from a variety of different Christian backgrounds.
The study group was starting a new series of sessions when we joined, in the autumn of
0202, having taken a month’s break for the summer holiday. It was a non-denominational group
that had been formed by a group of attendees at an “Alpha” course at a large Protestant
evangelical church in downtown Cairo, Qasr Dobara.02 The group, of mixed denomination, had

09

Trotter II, Robert T. “Friends, Relatives and Relevant Others: Conducting Ethnographic Network Studies” in
Mapping Social Networks, Spatial Data, and Hidden Populations. Ethnographers Toolkit, ed, Jean J. Schensul,
Margaret D. LeCompte, Robert T. Trotter, II, Ellen K. Cromley, Merrill Singer. (AltaMira Press 0999), 0- 42.
02

The Alpha course is an introductory course to the basics of Christian belief and practices; it originated in the
Anglican Church but is expressly non-denominational and is held in churches of different denominations around the
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chosen to continue their biblical discussions in a regular session, and word of mouth had
expanded the group from an original five to a current maximum of 01, as those who participated
invited their friends. Around 04-02 attended each week.
In the group, according to Dina, one of the informal organizers and a veteran Alpha
course leader, the “majority” were Coptic Orthodox, with a couple of Protestants (including
herself) and “very few” Catholics. Although the group had coalesced around an activity by a
Protestant church (and formulated along Protestant lines), the bible study itself was not officially
affiliated with Alpha or with Qasr Dobara Church, nor did the group address discuss topics with
an explicitly Protestant agenda. Dina described to me the way the group avoided differences:
We have a friend, Mary; she’s very Orthodox, but we never get into things that
can… make problems…like the saints or Mary. These topics are not discussed.
We usually discuss things from the Bible. We just read a paragraph from the
bible and start discussing it.

Other members of the bible study group showed the same kind of complex religious
affiliations and experiences; Irene, whom I later interviewed, came from a Catholic family but
was now evangelically-oriented (but did not like to describe herself as belonging to a particular
denomination). Youssef, the group’s powerful leading presence, came from an observant Coptic
Orthodox family and now, like Irene, was Protestant-oriented.
As I started to meet with other informants, away from the bible study group, I wondered
if these kinds of patterns would be replicated, and I found that the other women I interviewed
had similar attitudes and experiences. They had friends and often family members who attended
different churches; and they too had participated in religious activities outside of their churches.
world. For information on Qasr Dobara, see Dowell, Anne, “The church in the square: negotiations of religion and
revolution at an evangelical church in Cairo,” Egypt, Masters thesis 0200.
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Even Christina, an informant who was strongly committed to her Coptic Orthodox identity, had
experimented, attending an evangelical service at Qasr Dobara. Several of my other informants
had gone from one denomination to another, and sometimes back again.
Instead of encountering the discrete Christian communities I had initially expected, I
found myself mixing with groups of people who were interested and engaged with Christianity,
but did not attach much importance to denomination.00 Upper-middle class Christians could not
easily be segregated into denominations, without dividing parents from children, friendship
groups, social networks, and even bible study groups.00
The rigid boundedness of the Coptic Orthodox community – emphasized in the literature
- did not seem true for my informants. I found myself rethinking my conceptions about the way
upper middle class Christians in Egypt experience religious categories, and I was faced with
several choices. I could have expanded my fieldwork in order to locate and select informants
with stricter ties to the Coptic Orthodox Church and tradition, and undoubtedly it would have
been possible to find individuals like this. The young Christians I built relationships with would
often make distinctions between a “strict Copt” or “very Coptic” and someone who was “not so
religious”, and I could have sought out contacts using these kind of descriptions.
But such an approach felt artificial and would have required that I seek out research
subjects who conformed to my definitions of authenticity. A more honest approach seemed to be

00

Various different Protestant missionaries arrived in Egypt in the late 09th and early 02th century, and many aimed
their efforts at Copts rather than Muslims. Under influence of missionary-founded schools, many Copts did convert,
including some power and wealthy families, such as the aristocratic Wissa from Assiut. These missionary schools
had a major impact on the Coptic community, influencing the process of revival and reform by spreading new ideas
about modernity and about church-lay relationships.
00
Mixed-denominational marriages were also fairly common, although I did not have the chance to interview any of
these couples.
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to chart the way my expectations, as an outsider, were interrupted by the lived reality of my
informants.

Methodology and fieldwork
My fieldwork, conducted between 0202 and 0200, was based on qualitative research
methods – participant observation and semi-structured interviews. Initially, I built relationships
with an existing group of Coptic contacts and friends, and I was able to engage in informal
participant observation of daily lives as well as of specific religious practices and activities. A
second main stage of participant observation started towards the end of the summer of 0202; a
contact invited me to accompany her to a bible study group, and I attended the sessions with her
for several months.
I started my formal interviews towards the end of 0202, starting with several bible group
members, and then branching out to other contacts. I focused, in my semi-structured interviews,
on trying to map out existing social networks as much as possible; for example interviewing
(separately) two cousins, or two close friends, to try to understand the social context in which my
informants operated. These interviews were generally recorded, and took place in cafes, or in the
informants’ homes. I continued my participant observation over this period.

The insider/outsider binary

19

Anthropological research on Christian communities in the Middle East can be difficult, as
it draws on a particularly problematic history of foreign interference, which complicates the
already difficult job of the researcher who must be conscious of her positionality and voice.
European colonial powers justified their actions in the region on the basis of protection of
native Christian groups, claiming jurisdiction over religious minorities under Ottoman rule. In
Egypt, colonial rule was marked by a divide and rule approach. The nationalist movement
explicitly rejected this divisive approach, deploying symbols of religious unity, and many Copts
were active in the struggle against colonialism. However, Coptic issues remain embedded in
discourses about national identity and authenticity, rendering them highly sensitive, particularly
to any perceived foreign agendas or foreign interest.
As a non-Egyptian, non-Coptic researcher, studying the Coptic community required that
I situate myself within this complex network of competing and overlapping discourses. It also
colored my encounters; I found simply explaining that I was researching Coptic issues would
often lead Egyptians, both Muslim and Christian, to explain their take on the issues at some
length. Their explanation was not a response to my purposely vague statement of interest, but
rather to their assumptions about my opinions (as a foreigner). These responses were so
remarkably uniform that I started to note down the pattern; upper middle class Muslims would
usually respond to the topic with a defensive statement about the lack of conflict between
Muslims and Christians in Egypt “normally” or “in the past” and the attribution of violence
today to a few extremists. I never mentioned an interest in studying discrimination, or IslamicChristian relations, but many of my Muslim interlocutors assumed that this was my purpose and
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that they would need to challenge my (presumed) assumptions that Christians in Egypt were
oppressed by Muslims.00
My findings are the therefore the product not only my own subjective experience as an
outsider to Coptic and Egyptian culture, but as an outsider, provoking a particular range of
assumptions and reactions among the people I spoke to. If my encounters were shaped by my
outsider status, it is worth noting research conducted by those with “insider” status is not
unproblematic. Ganiel and Mitchell, discussing religious ethnography, argue that insider/outsider
status is not fixed, and that “one's religious identity is mediated through a host of other social
identities.”01 Some of the scholarship on Coptic issues does assume a privileged right to speak on
behalf of research subjects because the author shares a religious identity with them. In fact,
identities are multifaceted; each researcher is situated in a certain way in relation to the people
they study.
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Chapter 2: The Production of Culture and Community in Egypt
This chapter will analyse some of the key debates that surround the definition of
Copticness, the minority status of the Coptic community, and the relationship between Copts and
state. It will look at the Coptic “revival”, related processes of change that reformulated the
church, the Coptic community and the relationship between the two in the twentieth century,
creating a revivified Coptic identity that focused inward on the community. It will attempt to
describes these processes of change in class terms.

Defining Copts
As Paul Sedra has noted, the act of defining a distinct Coptic community is, by its nature,
political and contentious.04 To speak about “the Copts” is to enter into a coded debate about the
nature of Egyptian identity and the relationship of the Egyptian state to its citizens.
Various conflicting and overlapping definitions of Copticness exist in contemporary
Egyptian society. For some, ‘Copt’ has been reclaimed as a signifier of a kind of Egyptian ethnic
identity. The reimagining of the Egyptian past in light of the pharaonic discoveries of the 09th
century has led some (particularly secular Christian elites) to use the word to describe a unique
ethnicity that all Egyptian natives share, regardless of religious allegiance. According to this
view, there are “Muslim Copts” and “Christian Copts”.
Another interpretation is to use “Copt” as both an ethnic and a religious marker, and the
autochthonous, authentic Egyptian-ness that it represents is a quality possessed only by Christian
04
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Egyptians. Christian Egyptians (Copts) therefore are constructed as a racial and ethnic group that
is separate from Muslim Egyptians, descended from a glorious Egyptian past (normally the
pharaonic period). The religious division in society is therefore imbued with an ethnic quality in
which Christians are Copts and Muslims are Arabs, rendering Muslims the descendants of
foreign invaders and therefore less authentically Egyptian.

Defining a minority
Within Egypt, Copts currently make up around 02 per cent of the population.02
Historically, the Coptic community has been constituted in different ways, with some currents
emphasizing Copticness as a racial or religious category that separates Copts from other
Egyptian citizens, and others denying that religious affiliation has any meaning in the public
space, and preferring to describe it as a confessional identity that is (or should be) restricted to
the private sphere.
In the 0992s, with a resurgent public Islamism visible in public spaces, and concern
about Islamist violence, the question of Coptic identity and status within Egyptian society was
again a contentious topic. In 0990, a proposed conference entitled “The United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Minorities and People of the Arab World and the Middle East”
included the Copts on the agenda and was to be held in Cairo. There was a strong public
reaction, and a number of key figures, including Coptic Orthodox Patriarch Shenouda III,
02
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prominent lay Coptic voices like Samir Morqos, and Muslim thinkers such as Mohamed
Hasainan Haikal condemned the designation of Copts as a minority.
These critics of this conference’s agenda argued that that the division of Egypt into
Muslim (majority) and Christian (minority) was an inaccurate description of Egyptian society, as
Christians and Muslims were both Egyptians and religious affiliation was not a relevant way to
divide the nation.
The term minority in Arabic (aqalliyya) can be interpreted to imply lesser status rather
than numerically smaller, and therefore imply a particular power relationship rather than
demographic reality. The response, led by the regime and other key stakeholders in the official
narrative of Egyptian unity such as the Coptic Orthodox Church hierarchy, represented a
rejection of a threat to an official national unity narrative. To reject the label of minority when
attached to Egyptian Christians is to reject the implication that religious affiliation affects the
relationship between citizen and state.
Paul Sedra has identified two strands of thought within Coptic society, the “national unity
strand” and the “persecution strand”. The national unity strand positions “Copts as so fully and
harmoniously integrated into Egyptian society as to be indistinguishable from Muslims”.04 In
this discourse, Copts and Muslims have been historically united, particularly against foreign (i.e.
Western) invaders such as the Crusaders, the French and the British. In contrast to this stands the
persecution strand which views the Copts as an ethnically separate group from the Muslim
counterparts, who have suffered at the hands of an Islam-dominated state.
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Official discourse of the Mubarak era sanctioned a version of the national unity narrative,
publically rejecting, as in the case of the 0991 conference, any implications from perceived
outsiders, that Copts were disadvantaged by their religious status. The Coptic Orthodox Church,
which had reached what Mariz Tadros describes as an “entente” with the Mubarak regime, also
sanctioned a version of this narrative, particularly in its interventions on issues relevant to public
life.08
The vigorous public response by various establishment voices to the proposed conference
on minorities is a potent example of how any attempt to challenge this state-endorsed
representation is considered to be a threat – particularly when the discussion is started by
“foreigners”. The national unity discourse consistently asserts that Copts and Muslims must
unify against foreign threats and that attempts to frame Coptic identity in other ways are hostile
to the Egyptian nation.
Samer Soliman argues in his 0229 article on Coptic protest that, since the incident in
099091, it has in fact become more acceptable to apply the term minority to the Copts in public
debate, and to acknowledge that there is a Coptic question.09 He quotes a 0222 article by
Mohamed Hasainan Haikal in which he uses the term minority to describe Egyptian Copts, in
contrast to his stated position in 0991.
It may be that towards the end of the Mubarak era, some of the rhetoric had shifted, and
some sense of difference between Copts and Muslims could be acknowledged publically without
provoking accusations of sectarianism and treachery; but the main elements of the national unity
discourse were still deployed to shut down real debate about topics such as sectarian violence,
religious persecution, legal inequalities and barriers to freedom of worship, etc. When the so08
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called “Coptic question” is raised, the underlying issues and debates are ignored and the problem
is concealed by rhetoric. For example, violence against Copts is attributed to Islamist terrorists
(who are also a threat to wider Egyptian society) or its sectarian dimensions are ignored, for
example in the 0200 incident in which a Muslim policeman shot six Christians who were
unknown to him. 12 This avoids challenging official narratives that define all Egyptians as equal
citizens regardless of religion.

The Coptic revival and Coptic identity politics
Despite the deployment of the national unity narrative at key moments to shut down
debate about contentious issues, framing Coptic identity in ethno-religious terms has become
increasingly dominant with the Egyptian Coptic community. A particular minoritarian discourse
has taken shape in the second half of the twentieth century, produced and sustained by a
“revived” Coptic community, centered on the Coptic Orthodox Church.
Initial processes of reform and revival within the Coptic community were the result of an
exposure to Western modernity. Anthony O’Mahony has characterized this first series of
changes as the “lay” reform phase. 10 In the 09th century, the Coptic community in Egypt was
headed by aristocratic, land-owning Coptic families, who, like the Muslim elite of the time, were
exposed to Western ideas and practices. Under Mohamed Ali, and later under the British
protectorate, other, non-Coptic Christian denominations started to establish churches and
communities in Egypt.10 These new churches and missionaries began to establish schools and
educational establishments, which were popular among the Coptic elite, who were then exposed
12
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to new religious ideas and to new models of Christian practice, hierarchy and priesthood.10 This
exposure led to complaints that the Coptic clergy was “backward” 11 and pressure was put on the
Coptic religious establishment to reform to remedy its stagnation in the face of modernity.
With the formation of the majlis al-milli (community council) in 0841, the Coptic elite
had a formal tool for overseeing communal affairs and for pressing for reform. As well as
supervising the financial affairs of the community, there was an emphasis on educational reform,
and improving the educational level and overall quality of the Coptic priesthood. Patriarch
Kyrillos IV (0841-0820), the “father of reform (abu al-islah)” began training programs for
priests and deacons. Under the reign of his successor, Kyrillos V (0841- 0904), a council scheme
to form a theological seminary, which would provide clergy for the first time with systematic
training, was approved by the patriarch and eventually started functioning in 0890 . Various
charitable and educational associations were also founded, and Coptic schools and hospitals were
established.
In this period, the Western-educated lay elite set the agenda, using the community
council as a tool to modernize the community. The second “monastic” phase of reform 14 would
result, ultimately in the displacement of the landed Coptic elite in favor of Coptic clerics.
This “monastic” revival that started to take place in the early 02th century was a result of
some of the earlier changes. As part of the movement towards educational reform and
modernization of the community, Habib Guirgis, an archdeacon who had been among the first
students at the newly inaugurated theological seminary, created a committee to provide religious
instruction to Coptic youth.
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The committee, which was established in 0908, formed branches all over Egypt, with the
aim of encouraging the religious instruction of Coptic children between the ages of four to the
end of high school.12 This “Sunday School Movement” attempted to strength the community in
the face of pressure from other denominations and missionaries.
The movement was massively influential, providing a centralized, unified model of
religious education that reinvigorated religious identity, stressing the centrality of the Church in a
Christian life that had a lasting impact on the Coptic community.
One of the results of these educational reforms was the influx of a new group of middle
class, often university-educated Copts who taught in the Sunday schools before choosing to enter
the monasteries. Many then went on to join the clerical hierarchy (among them Nazeer Roufail,
the future Patriarch Shenouda III). 14
The “monastic” project of reform differed from the lay movements of the late 09th
century in its aims. Whereas the lay reformers had focused on modernizing and rationalizing the
community and the church as part of a project to build a modern Egypt, the new middle class
monastic reformers were concerned with effecting a spiritual revival in a church that was
threatened by resurgent and sometimes hostile Islamist politics and the presence of other
Christian denominations. This revival would aim to define a Coptic identity which looked
inward, focused on family, church and community.18
The rise of this generation of middle class reformers also coincided with political changes
that displaced the Coptic old landowning families. After the 0940 revolution, land reforms and
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subsequent emigration contributed to an increasing marginalization of the former leading Coptic
families. Kyrillos VI had no allegiances to this lay elite and could therefore build a strong,
cooperative relationship with President Gamal Abdal-Nasser.

Creating an imagined Coptic community
The revival process involved significant institutional reform of both church and
community, restoring the authority of the church hierarchy and re-centering communal life on
the church. Control of monasteries was centralized and numbers of bishops and priests were
increased.19 Bishops, who had previously had largely independent control over their dioceses,
were now subject to more patriarchal oversight. Through a process El-Khawaga describes as a
“massive institutionalization”,42 the lay community was also brought into the institution of the
church through an expansion in the number of lay khudaam (servers), who were to assist in every
aspect of church life. Some within the community contested this expansion, arguing that it
politicized relationships between the church and the lay community. 40
This generation of reformers enacted a kind of neo-traditionalist approach to create a
common Coptic identity, based on the proud re-appropriation of a supposedly glorious Coptic
past. A revival of interest in monastic vocations saw the numbers of monks and monastic
foundations increase dramatically around the turn of the century. Theological doctrine was
expressed through a fundamentalist, literal approach to biblical scripture.40
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These reforms created an “imagined Coptic community”

40

based on a common identity,

formulated in ethno-religious terms. This community was centered on the church and represented
by the clerical hierarchy. El-Khawaga describes the process as a “retotalization of meaning”,41
through which religion became a complete source of identity.44
This neo-traditional Coptic community, centered on the church, was the product of an
emerging Coptic middle class, and in the post-Nasserite era, it was the Coptic middle classes
who gained most from the protection of a communal identity and a strong church. This middle
class – reliant on university education for their status – was hit by Sadat’s economic polices,
which caused contraction of the state and its social services, as well as a reduction in social
mobility.
The situation of this broader middle class has become increasingly precarious, as
unemployment figures for graduates remain high. It is this vulnerable group that has embraced
the new Coptic identity and the protection of a community and church that provides needed
social services as well as religious ministry.

The state and minoritarian discourse
Under Mubarak, the Egyptian state utilized the national unity rhetoric to forestall
potentially threatening discussion about sectarianism and the relationship of Coptic Egyptians to
the state. This rhetorical tool, when deployed at the level of public discourse, closes down these
debates by portraying any consideration of sectarian issues in Egypt as an attack on the nation. In
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doing so, the regime was supported by the religious establishment of the Coptic Orthodox
Church.
However, despite this strategic deployment of nationalistic imagery, the Mubarak regime
invested in the emerging minoritarian identity described above. The cordial relationships
between the regime and the Coptic Orthodox hierarchy are one factor in explaining this.
Relationships between patriarchs and presidents since the 0940 revolution have
fluctuated. 42 Kyrillos VI offered the regime of Gamal Abdal Nasser complete support on behalf
of the Coptic community, and Nasser dissolved the aristrocratic majlis al-milli by presidential
decree, restoring complete control of the community to the religious hierarchy, and effectively
making the church the mediator between the state and Copts.44
Their successors had a fraught relationship with the state. Anwar Sadat’s decision to
emphasize the Islamic nature of the Egyptian nation caused Shenouda to struggle with the
regime, urging Copts to abstain from voting in the referendum on Article 0 of the constitution
which would make Islamic sharia the “principal” source of Egyptian law and Islam the religion
of the state, and later staged a public act of defiance in 0982 by withdrawing to a monastery in
Wadi Natrun and cancelling Easter celebrations. In 0980 Sadat rescinded the presidential decree
that recognized Shenouda as patriarch and kept him under house arrest at a monastery, where he
was confined until 0984.
After his reinstatement by Hosni Mubarak, the relationship between church and state was
reshaped; Tadros characterizes it as an “entente”. The patriarch once again became the official
representative of the Coptic community, and the church supported the regime. Under this new
42
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arrangement, the state supported the church hierarchy, for example granting licenses to build
new churches directly to Shenouda, who would then be able to distribute these among his
dioceses as he saw fit.48
The Coptic community was also marshaled by the church to support Mubarak’s political
projects; Mubarak’s reelection in 0224 was celebrated by the ringing of church bells, which
“according to orthodox doctrine are only to be rung on the commencement of mass and other
religious rites.”49 During the 0224 constitutional referendum, which was widely opposed by the
political opposition, Patriarch Shenouda encouraged Copts to vote and to support the
amendment. 22
This entente fostered the kind of minoritarian discourse that the Coptic revival process
had created. By recognizing the patriarch as the official representative and voice of the Coptic
community, the state endorsed this emerging ethno-religious identity, by which Copts are
characterized by religion rather than by citizenship.20

Divorce struggles
One key area of contestation between lay followers of the church and clerical hierarchies
has been the right of Coptic Orthodox members to seek divorce. In 0908, the majlis al-milli
outlined eight different grounds for seeking a divorce, including abandonment and irreconcilable
differences. Pope Shenouda removed most of these grounds, keeping only adultery and change
of religion, effectively restricting access to divorce.
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The clerical hierarchy has defended its exclusive right to define grounds for divorce (and
effectively limit it) as non-negotiable, despite challenges from lay members of the church. The
church authorities have the power to dictate a particular (conservative) approach to access to
divorce, and lay members have been unable to bring about change. Some have looked for
alternatives,20 but others continue to contest the church’s authority to dictate divorce policy,
proposing civil family laws that would remove divorce from clerical authority. These battles
reflect the wider struggles between the clergy and the lay elite over questions of power.
After the January 0200 uprising, and with the opening up of political space that followed,
various currents in the Coptic community have also been reconfigured. A renewed and active lay
contestation of clerical authority over the divorce issue is taking place. A new campaign called
the “Right to Life” has escalated the level of open contestation, with public protests against the
church and threats of mass conversion.20 It remains to be seen how the issue will develop as the
political environment changes; but it seems likely that a reinvigorated laity will continue to
contest clerical authority around this issue.
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Ch. 3 Gender and Community

This chapter will provide an overview of official Coptic Orthodox Church precepts and
teachings about gender roles, and will describe some non-official Coptic narratives about gender.
It will show how ideas about female behavior and female sexuality are linked to the kind of
minoritarian discourses and sensibilities identified in the preceding chapter, and using the salient
example of controversies over “kidnapped” Coptic women, it will show that these group
identities are often contested using women as symbols.

Gender roles and the Church
Who does the New Testament say is the head, man or woman? This is mentioned
in Ephesus, chapter 4, and many times in the First Epistle to the Corinthians. ’I
want you to know that the head of every man is Christ, the head of woman is man.
For man is not from woman, but woman from man. Nor was man created for the
woman, but woman for the man. For this reason the woman ought to have a
symbol of authority on her head, because of the angels.’ (0Cor. 00: 0, 8-02).
On Homosexuality and the Ordination of Women, Patriarch Shenouda 00021

The Coptic Orthodox Church emphasizes a number of different elements when it
discusses the behavior of its female members. One of the key precepts of the church on gender is
that men and women are fundamentally different in nature, and are therefore suited to different
roles. This discourse is supported by reference to scripture, both Old and New Testament, which
is seen as supporting the view that men and women have different essences and therefore should
take on different responsibilities. There is also a quasi-scientific element presented in discussions
about male and female roles. The different natures and capacities of men and women are
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presented as obvious and manifest through observation of the world and of human
relationships.24
The differences between men and women in nature necessitates a difference in authority.
The male-female relationship (particularly the husband-wife relationship) is modeled on the
relationship of Christ to his church. 22 A Christian woman “feels man is her equal without
forgetting to be willingly submissive to her husband, not out of fear or humiliation but out of
love and respect for him just as the church submits to Christ of its free will.” 24
Marriage is seen as a holy union, and the duty of all Copts, with the exception of those
who choose to follow a monastic vocation. One of the most important purposes of marriage is to
have children. The different roles of men and women are important within a marriage; the man
exercises Christ-like authority, and the woman’s greater emotional sensibilities suit her to
guardianship of the home and children. Women’s roles as wives and mothers is of paramount
importance as they ensure the future of the community:
A woman has great responsibilities. Among these responsibilities, I may mention,
is having pastoral care for children in order to prepare a new generation for the
Church. One of our problems is that women have no time to care for their
children.28

Rhetoric about the dangers of liberal, Western or feminist interpretations of gender roles
is common. Women may work outside the home, and are valued as servers in church; but a
neglect of wifely and maternal duties is problematic for the entire community. In his work on the
24
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“virtuous wife”, Shenouda starts his book with the observation that “many speak about women’s
rights but the more pertinent issue is that a woman is virtuous.” 29 This rejection of Western
values runs through church discourses on sex and gender roles.
Sex is a spiritual act, reflecting the spiritual union of the married couple, and is strictly
reserved for marriage. The topic of sexuality and relationships is an important one that often
comes up in the official literature.42 Sexuality, it is argued, is properly expressed in Christian
marriage and there are dangers of succumbing to lust which must be resisted for emotional and
spiritual health.
In these discussions about how to avoid sin and how to make the right choices, no
distinction is made between male and female Christians. The instructions on appropriate sexual
behavior – no sexual activity before marriage; resisting temptation; the natural experience of
sexual desire; choosing a partner through prayer and reflection rather than attraction - are aimed
at Christians of both sexes. Both men and women are seen as being capable of sexual desire, and
both are responsible for keeping themselves “holy and pure” 40 by refraining from sex outside
marriage.
However, alternative understandings of sexuality are common among the Coptic
community. Pieternella Van Doorn-Harder discusses a different vision of sexuality, in which
Christian women are evaluated by their sexual chastity in a way that men are not, when she
describes how women who wish to become nuns are evaluated for their suitability.Van DoornHarder describes how Coptic women are required to vigilantly guard their honor and outlines the
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strategies used to achieve this - “confinement”40 i.e. containing the woman within the home as
much as is possible and “protection” – accompanying the woman when she does leave the house.
In this gender schema, which Van Doorn-Harder attributes to “Egyptian society”, Coptic
women’s sexual virtue is compromised by acting in ways that are considered inappropriate for
“nice girls”, such as spending time outside the house without good reason, or “kissing or holding
hands” with a fiancé.
Some of these behaviors are proscribed in the official doctrine of the Church; for
example, Bishop Moussa responds to the question, “why are Egyptians so strict in regards to
boys and girls talking together?” with the answer: “We are not strict, but cautious, for talking,
results in phone calls, and phone calls result in dating, and dating may result in harmful sins.”40
To the questioner who asks if it is okay to have a boyfriend, if she does not do anything wrong,
he responds: “By having a boyfriend or girlfriend we are leading ourselves into temptation. Let
your relations be in groups from within the church until the time comes for you to select your
partner for marriage.”41
However, in these official responses, dating and romantic relationships are forbidden as
they may lead to sin; but they are forbidden for men and for women, and are equally problematic
for both.
In the lived reality that Van Doorn-Harder describes, these proscribed activities are
problematic primarily for Coptic women. “The responsibility of self-control falls upon the young
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woman who is eager to keep her reputation as a ‘nice girl’ because her ‘nice girl’ behavior
enhances her possibilities for finding a good husband.” 44
In Van Doorn-Harder’s analysis, a “nice Coptic girl” is one who “spends most of her free
time in church, attending the liturgy, bible studies, social gatherings, and charitable
activities….When a young woman does something that is considered wrong and loses her honor
(for example, becoming pregnant before marriage), her shameful behavior is seen to reflect on
the whole church.” 42
Women’s virtue, and particularly their sexual honor, is important not only as a
relationship between the individual and God. At a community level, women’s honor is
understood to have implications for the honor of the group. Women are therefore subjected to
particular restrictions and their lives are policed by the church and the community with a greater
rigor.
Van Doorn-Harder is describing contemporary judgments about ordinary lay Coptic
women; but she notes, when discussing those women who wish to follow the monastic path, that
the same relationship between individual female honor and the honor of the commu nity exists.
One elderly woman in the church explained the situation as follows; “A nun has
to be very sure of her call. It is just like in a marriage. When a girl does not feel
happy in her marriage and wants a divorce [although this is forbidden in the
Coptic Church], everybody will say, ‘what did she do wrong? Why did she not
behave well?’ It always the woman who is to blame.”44

Other manifestations of this policing of female honor include restrictions on female dress
and on other behavior that is culturally associated with compromised sexual virtue. Coptic
44
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women who are not from the upper middle class may be expected to dress “modestly”.48 This
takes different forms; for the women in Zaki’s study, who are part of the urban poor, this might
take the form of an abaya or a hijab.49 In other environments, women might be expected not to
reveal lower legs or arms; to wear high necklines, or to wear a one-piece bathing suit instead of a
two-piece.82

Idealized images – the virtuous wife
Febe Armanios has explored some of these perspectives on gender within contemporary
Coptic culture. Her study is an analysis not of official Church precepts or doctrine on gender
issues, but rather an analysis of how idealized images of women and wives are deployed in wider
written discourses. She locates a “developing perspective on gender” that deploys “two
discernible representations of the female prototype” 80– the virtuous wife and the virgin saint,
appearing in the written discourses of the Coptic community. Her study uses a few official
church sources (including a publication by Patriarch Shenouda) with a focus on lay Coptic
authors.
The idealized virtuous wife who guards the home is not a new idea; Armanios argues that
this particular image was originally deployed in the late 09th and early 02th century by lay Coptic
writers as part of an identity politics that viewed modern Copts as inheritors of a pharaonic
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heritage. For these writers, the virtuous Coptic wife was an essential part of “retrieving the
hidden/inner essence of the Coptic identity”.80
Coptic nationhood would be preserved through the Coptic family, and woman would be
the guardians of the home and family. “She was to police its purity and could achieve spiritual
cleanliness by attending church, praying and fasting, hence compensating for her husband’s
expected preoccupation with the outside world.” 80
Armanios argues that these images have emerged in contemporary Coptic discourse
(including in official rhetoric) but couched in religious terms, so that the Pharaoh-husband has
become a Christ-husband, with the same qualities of “authority, domination and control over the
home”.81 The home now, instead of representing the Coptic nation, is “a perfect spiritual
sanctum” which is guarded by the Coptic wife.
She describes this process as the appropriation of older secular images as a result of the
changing Coptic identity politics of the second half of the twentieth century, and she argues it
reflects an “inclination by Coptic clergy towards a nationalist, predominantly non-religious and
modernist rhetoric about the place of gender in the Coptic family”

84

that links the survival of the

minority community with the “role of its female members.”
The kind of contemporary representations of female roles and female sexuality that
Armanios describes are somewhat different from the doctrinal judgments about sexuality
outlined above. When Bishop Moussa deals with questions on sexuality, most of his responses
are addressed to men and to women equally. The responsibility of staying pure is the
80
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responsibility of a pious Christian regardless of gender. When he addresses questions about
sexual desire, or about pre-marital sex, there is almost no specific emphasis on the specific value
of preserving female virginity or virtue.
However, these official discourses do argue that men and women have different natures
and are designed by God to hold different roles in society. The official literature on marriage
argues that the wife’s proper sphere is the home, and her responsibility is to home and children,
and that the relationship between wife and husband will be one of submission to loving authority,
on the model of the Church’s submission to Christ.
The developing discourses on idealized images of Coptic women as virtuous wives
and/or pious virgins that Armanios outlines incorporate some of these key doctrines while
refining or ignoring others. The key image of a Christ-husband and a submissive wife is
compatible with church teachings about marriage; the emphasis on female virginity is located in
a burgeoning literature on female virgin-saints which “make an aggressive association between
femininity and flawless virginity.” 82

Gender and minoritarian discourse
Gender, like ethnicity, is a site where symbolic power may be contested.84 Deniz
Kandiyoti has outlined how nationalist projects in post-colonial states deploy women as “the
symbolic repository of group identity”.88 This symbolism manifests itself “in nationalist rhetoric
where the nation itself is represented as a woman to be protected, or less conspicuously, in an
82
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intense preoccupation with women’s sexual conduct. The latter often constitutes the crucial
distinction between the nation and its ‘others’.” 89
In Egypt, gender has been deployed in this way, as a site in which cultural identity is
contested. Gender symbols are deployed to “reproduce religious boundaries and to signify
religious differences when used strategically in public discourse.”92 Women become the bearers
of authenticity and are responsible for the reproduction of the community, and their sexual
behavior therefore becomes a topic of communal concern.
Within the Coptic community, contemporary discourses about gender follow this pattern.
Armanios shows that certain idealized images, particularly that of wifely virtue, are rooted in
concern about maintaining the community’s cultural (and spiritual) identity through female
sexual purity and guardianship of tradition. These images are reflected in the lived reality
described by Van Doorn-Harder, in the way in which female honor is policed.
This deployment of women’s bodies as markers of communal difference is shown in the
Coptic concern about the rights of unveiled women, who symbolize a Coptic nation under an
oppressive Islamic regime. In the cases of “kidnapped” Coptic women, communities often
literally struggle for the control of women’s bodies. When women convert (many Copts assert
that these cases are forced abductions), communal violence typical erupts as both communities
assert their right to claim the woman. The case of Wafaa Constantin in 0221 was particularly
high profile. Constantin was the wife of a priest in a village in Beheira, who disappeared from
89
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her family home. Mariz Tadros argues that Constantin was seeking a divorce after suffering
from domestic violence,90 and that having left her husband, she sought police protection as she
tried to convert to Islam. 90 However, this narrative remains contested; several stories circulated
among Copts at the time stressing Constantin’s happy family life and the imminent wedding of
her daughter, implying that she would not willingly have left the family home and must therefore
have been coerced or kidnapped.
The story of kidnapping and possible forced conversion sparked protests over the course
of several weeks at the Cathedral in Abbassiya. The reaction was particularly vocal because, as
the wife of a priest, her elopement would jeopardize priestly honor, and her conversion would be
particularly shocking and controversial. The church hierarchy, empowered by the state to define
and police the Coptic community, was able to gain access (through a presidential decree) to
Constantin, and to pressure her not to convert, and she retired to a nunnery.
This kind of case illustrates the way in which the church hierarchy, supported by the
state, is able to police the religious limits of the community. Constantin was not treated as a full
citizen whose legal rights regarding religion and divorce are defined by the state. Her status as a
priest’s wife made her case particularly sensitive and high-profile.
The church had the right to contest her choice to seek to change her religious identity. As
Soliman points out “Wafaa was not dealt with as an individual having the right to choose her
religion freely, but as a member of a community.” 90
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Beyond this “communitarianism” identified by Soliman, and the high-profile nature of
Constantin’s case, there are many more narratives of “kidnapped women” (or “disappearing
women”) who are described as being taken away from families and husbands and forced to
convert to Islam.
There is clearly a gendered element to these stories; although thousands of men convert
to Islam each year, it is only cases of women that cause strong public reactions and lead to adult
citizens being passed from state custody to that of the religious authorities.91
To touch on gender, and women, therefore, is to explore the contested space in which
group identities are articulated and produced.
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Chapter 4 - The Politics of Class
In this chapter, I will introduce some elements of the theoretical framework related to
class, status and social stratification that will be used to interpret and contextualize my fieldwork.
Bourdieu provides useful theoretical tools for describing and analyzing the social organization
and stratification of contemporary Cairo, and the place of the middle classes within this. The
chapter will then use fieldwork to describe the kind of middle class culture and identities of
which my informants are part.

Concepts of class and status
Class is an essential tool for understanding the social and political realities of
contemporary Cairo. Marx defined social classes in terms of their relationship to the means of
production, and for Marx, culture was essentially a product of economic power; the ruling class
reinforced their privilege by creating a ruling ideology. Weber found Marx’s approach to be too
economically reductive; although he agreed that class was based around relations to the market,
he also introduced other culturally-based elements to explain social stratification and
organization. For Weber, “status-honor” could be produced by non-economic elements
(ethnicity, race, religion, education etc), and he deployed this concept to complicate Marx’s
reductionist system of three classes derived solely from their relationship to property.94 Weber
“affirmed Marx’s equation of property and power, even while insisting that economic dominance
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economic ones.
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is always culturally mediated in patterns of socialization, lifestyles and discourses of honor and
prestige.” 92
If Weber never explicitly delineated the relationship between class and status,94 his
deployment of elements that can be labeled cultural (ethnicity, religion, socialization, etc.) to
define, categorise and analyse social groupings and social stratification is helpful for
anthropological research that attempts to deal with questions of class and identity.
In his anthropology of the Nepalese middle class, Mark Liechty notes that Weber’s
insights are particularly valuable for this kind of research project because of his observation that
“the middle class relates to economic or productive processes not primarily as sellers of labor
(workers) or owners of capital (the capitalist elite) but as consumers of goods in the market
place.” 98 This link between consumption and middle class identity was something I observed
from my own fieldwork.
Bourdieu provides useful analytical frameworks for analyzing social stratification and
middle class life in contemporary Cairo; in particular his description of the role played by
symbolic forms of capital, for example, “cultural” capital such as educational experiences, and
“social” capital such as connections. For Bourdieu, economic capital may be converted into these
other forms of capital, and in so doing, hierarchies of inequality are concealed behind judgments
about taste and aesthetic value.
These analytical categories and concepts provided me with a theoretical framework to
interpret my fieldwork.
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Situating my fieldwork

My main informants were situated within the upper middle class of Cairo – an affluent
sub-group within the broader urban middle class. Membership of the broader middle class
membership is not explicitly linked to income; rather, according to Anouk de Koning,99
following Armbrust 022, membership is “figured primarily in terms of education; To be middle
class meant having an education, being acquainted with modern institutions, and enjoying a
‘clean’ life, removed from Cairo’s lower class existence…” (00)020
The upper middle class that my fieldwork dealt with are the wealthiest members of this
broader middle class. De Koning defines them as “a relatively affluent professional upper-middle
class whose members are employed in the more international oriented segments of the urban
economy”.020
De Koning builds on Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic capital to articulate how this subgroup differentiates itself from the wider middle class:

What most clearly sets these upper-middle class professionals apart from other
middle class professionals is what I call ‘cosmopolitan capital’: familiarity with
globally dominant, first world repertoires and standards – for example, fluency in
English – as well as the ability to participate in conspicuously cosmopolitan
lifestyles. Whereas the urban professional middle class, symbolized by the
engineer and the doctor, was the main protagonist of Naserite Egypt, young
upper-middle class professionals employed in technologically advanced offices
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of internationally oriented companies have become iconic of the national
narratives and projects of Egypt’s new liberal era..” 020
De Koning’s term “cosmopolitan capital” describes the cultural resources that defines
this sub-group, and sets them apart from the broader middle class. These cultural resources are
clearly products also of economic advantage – for example, private schools and universities are
expensive and beyond the range of an average family income in Cairo, as are many of the
consumption patterns that de Koning observes – but they also serve to continue to produce a kind
of affluence. Young graduates with the symbolic capital of private university degrees, fluency
with foreign languages and cultural idioms, and the social networks provided by middle class
socialization, have privileged access to the kind of “internationally oriented” workspaces that de
Koning describes, and accordingly earn much higher incomes than the wider middle class who
are confined to less well-paying sectors.
My fieldwork has focused on the Christian members of this upper middle class subgroup.

Upper middle class culture and identity in the lives of my informants
The upper middle class is primarily an urban group; some families still have connections
with more rural areas, as in the case of interviewee Michael, whose father and grandfather were
landowners in the Minya area and held the position of ‘omda021. Michael had not inherited the
title, although he continued to spend a considerable amount of time in the area taking care of the
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family business. In general, however, my informants led urban lives, and Michael, who spent his
university days in Cairo, was now married, and had established a family home in the city.
Membership of the upper middle class requires a level of wealth; the financial resources
of the family must be adequate to provide a comfortable lifestyle for its members and a measure
of financial stability. Wealth – and class status – is held by family groups rather than
individuals. Individuals can break through class barriers, but elite status is usually described in
terms of family origins – being from “a good family” or “a good background.” My informants,
primarily younger members of the affluent middle class in their twenties and thirties, worked in
salaried professions in the kind of transnational and well-paying private sector workplaces that
de Koning outlined above; but most also came from families that hold assets which provide a
financial buffer, so that salaried income is not their sole source of wealth.
My informants were educated to graduate level, and some worked in middle class
professions that are highly respected in Egyptian culture – physician, pharmacist, engineer.
Others worked for multinational corporations that had opened offices in Egypt. Both men and
women were expected to graduate from university and to find appropriate work; Christina, who
was married and expecting her first child when I interviewed her, hoped to return to her job as an
electrical engineer at a large corporation at some point, and her aspiration to continue to work
outside the home after motherhood was fairly typical. Most of my interviewees had mothers who
had also worked outside the home at various points during their childhoods.024
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A key component of upper-middle class life in Cairo is its geography. My informants
lived in areas (primarily Mohandeseen, Heliopolis, Maadi) that were formerly considered to be
desirable suburbs where wealthy Egyptians could raise families away from the zahma (overcrowdedness) and undesirable urban realities of the city center.022
Unmarried interviewees lived with their parents in flats that were often rent controlled,
under regulations dating from the Nasserist era, rendering them effectively cost-free. Over time
these formerly exclusive suburban areas have become less exclusive, and the focus of the
wealthy has moved to new housing developments, established outside the city. These
communities are marketed as suburban fantasies through advertisements that show wealthy,
photogenic families escaping from the city, and many of my informants’ families had already
bought or were planning to buy property in these new developments.
The geography of upper middle class life requires access to a private car. Cairo has a
substantial but incomplete public transport network, and private cars provide the convenience
necessary to easily traverse an urban environment in which upper middle class social networks
are widely spread between suburban locations at opposite ends of the city (Heliopolis,
Mohandeseen and Maadi, for example). Private transportation also provides the safety of
segregation from a public space that now feels visibly dominated by an alternative class culture.
Subsidized gasoline renders cars cheap to run and long car journeys have become an
expected part of middle class daily life in Cairo. In many cases, private transport is also essential

There is clearly a socio-economic aspect to this, as domestic work in Egypt, including childcare, is relatively
affordable for the affluent.
022
For example, Mohandeseen was, in the 0982s, a fashionable and chic new location in a quiet area of Giza. Two
different family matriarchs recounted to me their experiences as young wives in the suburb, watching the view from
their balconies change over the years as villas became apartment buildings, roads became clogged with cars, and
“the quality of the people” in the neighborhood deteriorated.
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for work, as multinational companies increasingly choose to locate their offices in the new
developments located outside the city, with few existing public transport networks. Car
ownership therefore becomes a self-reinforcing cycle; new developments are planned to cater to
a small affluent section of society that already travels by car for almost every journey outside the
home, and which values open space and segregation from the realities of congested urban living.
Accordingly, most of my interviewees came from households where there are several
cars; in some cases, each adult member owned a car.024 Owning a car is a signifier of wealth, as
although gasoline is subsidized and cheap, private cars are subject to extremely high sales taxes
in Egypt, making them a relatively costly item to purchase and reserving the privilege of private
transportation for the relatively well-off.
Another key aspect of the lives of the upper middle class is a shared educational
background, which helps reinforce a kind of class consciousness. Upper middle class families
send their children to private schools which market themselves as having foreign curriculums
and learning styles. Most of my informants attended English-language schools with strong
British or American influences; a few attended Catholic French language schools. These schools,
including those formed by Christian missions, accept both Muslim and Christian pupils.
Private education typically extends to the completion of a bachelor’s degree at a private
university, although students who had selected certain technical disciplines not offered in private
universities such as Dina, a physician, were obliged to remain in the public sector.
As a result of this education, members of the upper middle class are usually fluent in at
least one foreign language, as well as Egyptian Arabic. Members of the lower-middle classes
024
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also study foreign languages as part of their education (sometimes at less expensive language
schools), but are rarely exposed so comprehensively. The comfortable fluency of the upper
middle class also gives them access to global popular culture. My interviewees and I shared
cultural references to books, films, popular music, television programs, and a certain kind of
Western consumerism, and these commonalities were less distinct when I spent time with
Egyptians from different backgrounds.
Another element of this identity was the extent to which the young upper middle class
have transnational experiences which have shaped their identities. In contemporary Egypt, there
are many kinds of migrants and many migration experiences; the upper middle class, however,
are located in a complex transnational space mediated by their bilingualism and their
consumption of global popular culture. All my interviewees had travelled abroad and almost all
had done so numerous times. These were generally not permanent relocations – shifts from a
natal culture to an alien one that might characterize the migration experience of a working class
Egyptian.
Nadine’s experience was typical; she had grown up in Dubai, where her parents had
moved to work, and she was part of a close-knit Coptic Orthodox community there. She visited
Egypt every summer for extended summer holidays, as well as for other kinds of trips,
particularly to see extended family. She was fluent both in English and Egyptian (not Gulf)
Arabic. As a teenager, she had returned to Cairo permanently with her family, and now that she
was married she was based in Cairo. Some time after our interview, she travelled to the USA
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(where she also had extended family) in the later stages of her first pregnancy to give birth in the
country and to ensure her daughter would obtain an American passport. 028

A non-sectarian identity
This shared class culture, and its valorization of cultural distinctions over economic
realities, had important implications for how young affluent members dealt with religious
identities.
The upper middle class is religious mixed, including both Christian and Muslim families.
One of the effects of sharing a class identity and class-segregated spaces – the private beach; the
expensive restaurant; the suburban neighborhood; the corporate office– is that social groups may
be class-segregated but religiously-mixed. My interviewees had formed friendships at school and
at university across religious networks and these friendships, along with new connections made
at work, typically formed the basis for adult social lives. At social events with my informants, I
rarely came across an all-Christian group, with the exception of family gatherings or religious
activities.
My informants also spoke about this during interviews, describing cross-religious
friendships. Many also explained to me that friendships with Muslims of a similar background
were easier than those with Christians from a different social group. Dina, from a wealthy
Protestant family, described to me her initial experiences studying to be a doctor at Cairo
university:

028
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returning to her life in Cairo after a short stay.
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Dina: “Medical school is not the AUC, it’s not like a very high class..you have all
the classes.”
Researcher: “They were mixed?”
Dina: “Yeah, all my friends were Muslim at first; they were the Maadi crew…”

Many of my informants explained to me, when talking about class, that what they had
more in common with and found it easier to spend time with Muslims from the same class
background than with poorer Christians. The shared class culture was a stronger unifying force
than religious identity was divisive.

Anxiety and unease
The economic privilege that defines the lives of the urban upper middle class is obscured
by a rhetoric that frames class difference in non-economic terms. My informants rarely described
Egyptian society using economic qualifiers, and terms like “class” or its Arabic equivalents
(mustawa’ igtimaya or tabaqah igtimaya) did not come up very often when describing self and
others, unless I initiated a conversation about the topic. Instead, class differences between self
and others were usually expressed in ethical, cultural, or educational terms. Egyptians from
different backgrounds were “ignorant” or “not open-minded”; being “high class” meant being
from “a good family” or being “the right kind of people”.
These kind of cultural distinctions reflect a kind of class anxiety that draws on memories
of a bourgeois existence in pre-revolutionary Egypt, destroyed by Nasser’s socio-economic
policies. These economic changes allowed some limited social mobility, and new groups were
able to access wealth. Some members of the professional middle classes were able to find work
in the Gulf and return to Egypt wealthy, but without the socialization processes described above.
54

The Egyptian ‘nouveau riche’ have acquired the economic standing to intrude onto protected
bourgeois space, and their doing so caused my informants to feel anxious.
During a 0202 trip to a private resort development on the north coast (for several
generations, the holiday destination of wealthy Egyptians during the hot summer months), I
found myself walking along the sand with a group of Coptic friends, as we tried to find a shaded
spot. Our visit was in September, after the rush of the high season, so the beach was not
particularly busy but there were small groups of people already laying their towels on shaded
patches of sand. The group I was with continued to pace along the sand, ignoring inviting empty
spaces adjacent to these parties of beachgoers. I couldn’t understand why we kept walking in the
sun past empty shaded spots. My companions struggled to explain to me that they were seeking a
space adjacent to the right kind of people. It was difficult for them to articulate a process that
they did not need to verbalize to each other; and it was a struggle for me to understand why the
other beachgoers were being rejected. They used phrases like “they’re not the right kind of
people,” or “they don’t look nice” to explain their reasoning.
After settling down in a spot that the group agreed was suitable, I asked my companions
to explain more about their choice. A male friend told me that if we sat next to the wrong sort of
people, the men might stare at the female members of our party, who were wearing two piece
swimsuits and other kinds of beachwear, and make them feel uncomfortable. But we had not just
passed young men; we had also walked passed a couple of family groups made up of veiled
women or women in various kinds of Islamically-modest beachwear. My companions found
these groups just as disturbing; the presence of women on the beach wearing hijabs was as
discomforting as the presence of men who might behave inappropriately.
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Asked to explain why a woman in an Islamic bathing suit and a headscarf was a
problematic sight, my companions would explain that “it doesn’t look nice”; “she shouldn’t be
here”; and the middle-aged female relative who had accompanied her adult children and their
friends on the trip explained to me that it didn’t use to be this way when she used to go on
holiday to the beach; women used to look “nice.” “Even the Muslim women?” I asked, as this
was an all-Christian group. She looked shocked. “Of course. This is a new thing.”
This encounter – and other similar experiences – happened on a private beach, at an
exclusive resort. The same kind of anxiety and conflict was repeated in other privileged spaces
which my informants were forced to share with Egyptians who had economic privilege, but
whose dress and behavior marked them out as not from “the right family” or not “openminded”.029
It is not surprising that an identity that is particularly associated with the middle classes –
the new Islamic piety that reiterates modesty and sexual segregation – is looked on with disdain
by large parts of the upper middle class, both Muslim and Christian. Knowing how to dress
(which clothes to buy; what styles to adopt; which hairstyles to choose; avoiding the hijab or at
adopting a loose style matched with more expensive imported brands of clothing that
differentiates from the brightly colored, man-made fabrics of the young middle class women)
involves a visual symbol that articulates not only religious cleavages, but also competing cultural
identities. My informants were explicit in their discomfort around symbols of a resurgent Islamic
piety that seemed to be not only invading the public space, but undermining a shared cultural
project built on ideas about modernity.
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to women who conform to a particular Islamic dress code, i.e. the hijab.
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Class and denominational flexibility
This upper middle class culture provided the context in which I carried out my fieldwork.
The bible study group that I attended and observed operated in this context. Dina, one of the
group leaders, explained how the group was created, after several of the members had completed
a course at an evangelical church in Cairo:
Dina: We needed more time to talk and discuss um, issues, kida, spiritual things.
So Youssef, one of the leaders in the group suggested that we start a bible study at
his place so that we can have more time to talk about different things and discuss
stuff. That’s how we started.
Researcher: Okay. When was that?
Dina: That was almost a year ago.
Researcher. Okay. So it was just for people on the course or you invited others?
Dina: Then we started inviting others. With just five, and then everybody started
to invite friends and now we’re 01, but not everybody’s commited. Not
everybody comes. We’re about 04, 02 every time.
Researcher: Are you still meeting in Maadi or you…
Dina: Um yeah, we used to meet a week in Maadi and a week in Mohandeseen,
because some of the people were from Maadi and some were from Mohandeseen
and Zamalek, but now I think it’ll be just Maadi.

The group had no explicit membership criteria, beyond curiosity about the Bible and a
willingness to commit to regular attendance; but the members of the group were nevertheless
part of a cohesive upper middle class group. The geography of the group expresses this clearly.
Members, in Dina’s summary, live in the elite suburbs of Mohandeseen, Maadi and Zamalek. No
lower middle class Shubra residents or working class Copts from Haram have found their way to
the meeting, because the group has been formed by drawing on existing social networks (i.e.
social capital).
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The meetings also rely on some unstated rules to function; in particular, a lot of English
was used during meetings. Initially, I was concerned that my presence as a foreigner had
disrupted group’s established pattern, and there were certainly initial attempts to make me feel
comfortable through translation, despite assurances that it was unnecessary; but observing
subsequent sessions, I felt more confident that the code-switching between English and Egyptian
Arabic was an authentic representation of the linguistic patterns of the members of the group.
One of the practices of the group was to read the Bible verse being examined in both English and
Arabic, to ensure full comprehension by members of the group; and I noted that several, perhaps
most of the members brought English language bibles rather than Arabic. Full comprehension of
the group’s session seemed to me to be restricted not to those who spoke English or Arabic, but
rather to those who spoke both.
If the socio-economic status of the group members was uniform, the denominational
backgrounds were diverse. The leaders of the group were mostly Protestant (or Protestantoriented) and the idea for the group had taken shape when some of the members came together
on an “Alpha” course at Qasr Dobara evangelical church. In this form, however, the bible study
group was quite open; most members were Coptic Orthodox and there didn’t seem to be any
agenda pushing members towards Protestant activities or Protestant interpretations.
The presence of so many Coptic Orthodox members at a bible study that was not only
outside formal church structures, but was associated at least informally with Protestant religious
activities, surprised me. Why did my informants not choose to attend a similar activity within the
Coptic church? The church provides a vast range of religious and social activities for every
section of the community, including bible studies, igtim’aat (religious meetings) for women, for
young people, for newly married couples, for graduates. Why had these young Coptic Orthodox
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members chosen to drive across the city to attend this meeting, when they could have gone to a
similar activity at their local church instead?
Class seemed to me to be an important part of the explanation. The group had been
formed from existing social networks and awareness spread solely by word of mouth, creating a
tiny community of peers. The shared social background created a comfortable atmosphere for
exploration, debate and questions.
In one session that explored the concept of Christian discipleship, group leader Youssef
told a story about persecution. Instead of drawing on the obvious examples of Egyptian
persecution in the modern era, or on the lives of the saints, he illustrated his point with an
account of a Russian Christian sent to Siberia under communist rule because of his faith. Telling
global stories rather than local ones could be a politically distancing effect to avoid raising
controversial debates about Egypt; but this was a private, trusting environment of close friends.
Instead, there as a sense of Christianity as a transnational rather than a local identity. The focus
of Youssef’s interest was not national; it was the global.002
A year later, during a trip to Canada, I attended a Coptic mass at a church in the suburbs
of Toronto, and I was reminded of Youssef’s Siberian example. The priest, giving a sermon in
Egyptian Arabic, told a story about a man who lived in Shubra, whose behavior carried a lesson
about relationships with neighbors. I felt the same sense of displacement. Youssef’s story (in
English) had ignored the local context in favor of emphasizing a global Christian narrative about
persecution. In Canada, the priest had deployed Egyptian images to make a point to a
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Youssef’s migrant background and experience may partially explain why he chose to use this example. However,
I found a lot of elements of his religious discourse, including this global focus, somewhat reflected in interviews
with Bible study attendee Irene, who had lived in Egypt her entire life, but travelled regularly to attend international
(usually evangelical) Christian events such as camps, meetings, conferences etc.
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congregation thousands of miles away from the country – the Egyptian experience had taken
priority over any local specificities.
Interviewing Youssef solidified some of these thoughts about locating Christian identity
in a global context. His parents were Coptic Orthodox, and he had been raised in Holland. As an
adult with a loose sense of Christian identity, he moved to London and lived an unsatisfying “life
of regret” which was transformed by a moment of spiritual clarity when he was invited to a bible
study group. He spoke to me at length about his spiritual transformation and he was confident in
his new calling to help others reach Christ and understand God.
Smartly dressed and articulate, he spoke English with a faint and hard-to-place accent. He
had been in Cairo since 0228 , living in Maadi and working for an oil company, and had been
involved in setting up the first Alpha course in Egypt. I asked him about his religious identity,
and he was reluctant to define his denomination. He termed himself “a follower of Christ” rather
than a Copt, but said that the “Coptic church was a huge element in telling people about the
truth.”
After learning more about Youssef’s background, the story of the persecuted Soviet
seemed to be clearer. It fit into this kind of transnational vision of Christianity; a global struggle
rooted in an eschatological battle not against the crude political realities of the Egyptian public
space, but as part of a much wider struggle for salvation and for knowledge of God in a world of
darkness. 000
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Irene, who was raised Catholic but referred to herself as “a daughter of the king” rather than with a
denominational category, reminded me of this focus when she told me during our interview that although Muslim
suffered from their lack of self-worth, the sexual permissiveness of the West that she saw when she travelled abroad
was equally bad for women.
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Youssef’s story seemed to me to be punctuated by encounters between Egypt and these
global sensibilities; as a young boy living in Holland and speaking Arabic and English but not
Dutch, or as a young man living in London, in love with a non-Egyptian woman his parents
would not accept, and finally as a wealthy professional in Maadi, discussing his calling to bring
people to Christ with the same confident, professional authority that he applied to explaining his
consultancy career.
As I continued in my fieldwork, I found that the kind of denominational mixing I had
observed in the bible study group was a feature of many of my informants’ lives. Just as the
Coptic Orthodox attendees had found something valuable in a non-denominational bible study,
many of my other informants did not fit into strict denominational categories.
There was a social element to this that I had not expected; social networks were not
structured around denomination. I had expected to locate discreet communities of Protestants,
Catholics, Copts etc. who might interact in some limited ways but were bounded by these
categories. Instead, my informants were situated in complex networks that were not structured at
all around denomination. Denomination did not form a dividing line in relationships, and did not
seem to provide an important identity marker for most of my interviewees. Many, perhaps most
of my informants had family members who belonged to a different church.
As a result of these mixed social networks, many of my informants had participated in
religious activities outside their church. Denominational mixed social groups led to
denominationally mixed religious activities.
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This kind of fluid approach to Christian identity and practice was obviously linked to
class.000 These Coptic Orthodox members shared a common class culture with non-Coptic
Christians, and were not as reliant on the Coptic Church. They have the freedom to explore
spiritual options outside the Church with limited censure.
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Dina, the Protestant women from Maadi, told me that in her experience, some Coptic Orthodox treated
Protestants as though they were “not Christian” or “worse than Muslims.” The exception, however, was “the open
minded people.”
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Chapter 5: Gender and Class Culture
This chapter will look at the responses of some of my informants to key ideas about
gender, and analyze what role ideas about class and about religion play in forming these ideas. It
will also discuss other ethnographic work that has examined the lives of Egyptian Christian
women and show how these ethnographic studies support the contention of many of my
informants, that class is a major factor in determining women’s roles.

I think Christian women have more freedom than Muslim women. I know I'm not
going to get divorced just one day because my husband just decided that. He's not
going to go marry someone else. (Interview with Christina)

I interviewed Christina, a Coptic Orthodox woman in her mid-02s, in her apartment in
Mohandeseen. She was heavily pregnant, and rested her hands on her stomach as she talked to
me. I had met her several times before, as she was part of the extended family of some of my
friends and interviewees. Less than a year earlier, I had attended her wedding reception in a
ballroom at a luxury hotel on the Nile. I had felt conspicuous in my plain cocktail dress,
surrounded by women wearing extravagant ball gowns.
Christina talked to me about her religious upbringing. She was educated at a private
Catholic girls’ school, which had around 22 percent Muslim pupils and 12 percent Christian.
Most of the Christian girls were, like her, Orthodox, with a few Catholics and “very few”
Protestants. Her mother had attended the same school, and her grandmother before her, and
Christina told me that she would like a daughter one day who could carry on the tradition.
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She spoke to me about her religious practices. She had grown up in a family that made a
point of attending church every weekend, together, and she considered this to be an important
routine and something that she wanted in her marriage. “That's the one thing that I wanted in my
house, and I prayed so badly that I'd have it.” When she first met her husband Amir, he did not
have the same approach to attending church every week.
We fought so many times about this…and he's like you can't impose… it doesn't
mean you're a better person because you go to church every Sunday. And then I
tell him no, it's not about being a better person, it's something I want for my
family.
After they had married, Amir’s attitude to going to church had changed:
When we got married things got a little easier; he felt somehow responsible, you
know, he's responsible for this house and he started to get used that we go every
Saturday. And now whenever I'm lazy, he's like, we didn't go, let's go. We never
go on time because that's a problem I have with him, but we try. But right now,
thank God, we go every Saturday, and we go and we see families that have their
babies, and I think, yeah, that's what I want.

For Christina, church was a valued part of her weekly routine; it was important spiritually
to attend, and she valued the emotional and spiritual experience of the ritual and of confession.
Apart from attending weekly services, Christina also used to attend a weekly church
group for graduates at her church, but had stopped because the sessions were on Friday
afternoon, disrupting the Friday-Saturday weekend. But in the period leading up to her wedding,
she and her then-fiancé had joined a group meeting at their church, specifically for engaged
couples.
The weekly group sessions comprised of a maximum of 02 people. Under the supervision
of the priest, different sessions were led by different speakers. As well as providing religious
guidance on marriage and on relationships, the sessions provided quasi-scientific tools for
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understanding and managing relationships, such as sessions devoted to personality assessments
and compatibility.

We discussed men are from Mars, women are from Venus. And we talked. One
time it was about what happens in the ceremony of the wedding. One time we
discussed sex, and how it's different for men and for women….
One time we took something called the DISC analysis…it's a scientific thing were
they give you like a text, 01 questions, how do you describe yourself.. You get
letters, tells you each person's pros and cons, you do it and your partner does it so
you know what conflicts you're going to have…so khalas you know he's going to
be around people, you like being the leader, he's always late…this took two
sessions….One time we talked about parents, our relationship with the in-laws,
what should be done….

The priest himself gave the session on the Coptic Orthodox marriage ceremony and the
meaning behind it. Two young female psychologists– both, like Christina, AUC graduates – led
sessions on psychological compatibility. Both were young Coptic Orthodox women. For the
session on sex, a married couple talked to the group.
The topics covered and the approaches taken in the class, according to Christina’s
account, seem to be in harmony with the kind of official ideals about gender roles outlined in
Chapter 0. Notions of gender complementarity are an integral element of the marriage values
that the weekly meetings promoted.
We talked about the role of the man and the woman…how in Christianity, the
man is the head of the house, and the woman should say yes to the man, but it's
not an imposed thing, and it should be done in love….And one time we discussed
the financial. We discussed how in Christianity it's our money, because we tend to
live in a Muslim environment where a woman can work or cannot work and the
money's hers, and the man does not have to know about it, and he's fully
responsible for the house, and she can spend her money on shoes or on her… or
whatever, but in Christianity there is no such thing as my money and how much I
make and how much you make it's our money and how much we make.
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Christina’s views about marriage reflected ideas about gender roles that the Church
endorses. She believed that men and women should hold different roles because of their different
natures, and this situation had to be explored and explained before embarking on a commitment.
She was enthusiastic about her experiences at the meetings and told me that she always
recommended the sessions to other engaged couples.
I think it helped us a lot in our engagement period. We avoided so many things
that could have gone wrong…because you know, men do that..and because we
both attended and we both put our heart into it….and when you know the
fundamental thing is that Christ is in the house, that's the number one
thing…when Christ is not the foundation of your house it's going to fall down.
In Christina’s view, Christian marriage did not mean strict, uncompromising obedience to
a Christ-like husband. She explained to me that it was a three-way relationship between herself,
her husband and God. Husband and wife had different roles to play, because they had been
given different natures - but this was a loving division of responsibilities based on mutual
respect, rather than a hierarchy of power. In one of her weekly sessions, the couples had been
taught the correct way to handle finances. In contrast to Islamic practice, under which wives are
entitled to financial support from husbands and any income they generate from employment
remains their own property, income was to be shared equally. Christina viewed this positively;
marriage was a joint project and both spouses would contribute and share what they had, as part
of a statement of joint responsibility. In Christina’s words:
The concept about the money…I feel like I'm there I'm in the house, I'm doing
something, we're together in this, you're not bigger than me, you're not better than
me, you know? I feel that, I don't know, the church has given the woman a very
good…I don't think there's a difference between a man and woman in the
church…They have different roles because of their different nature, but no one is
bigger than the other.
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Gender roles and official church doctrine
Christina was a religious person, committed to the Coptic Orthodox Church, who talked
to me at length about the importance to her of her relationship with God, and of including God in
her marriage.
Her views on marriage and relationships incorporated some of the basic official doctrines
that the Coptic Church endorses, but not all. Her interpretation of these doctrines (and implicit
rejection of some) seemed to me to be a product of her upper middle class background. Upper
middle class culture has a particular gender framework with specific expectations about female
roles and about marriage. Christina’s views were therefore quite different from the popular
rhetoric about female sexual virtue and behavior outlined in Chapter 0.
The notion of gender complementarity was an important foundation for her in
understanding her marriage. Her weekly church meetings had emphasized the different natures
and roles of men and women, and accordingly of wives and husbands, both through theological
explanations and through Western popular psychology (using books like Men are from Mars,
Women are from Venus). Christina agreed that men and women have different natures and
approaches to relationships, and she valued the sessions because they provided both spiritual and
psychologically to re authoritative ways to deal with this reality, and to understand her husband
and build a strong marriage.
However, Christina’s interpretation and experience of complementarity had not led her to
fully embrace the “virtuous wife” model. In her view, different gender roles were inevitable, but
the marriage would be built on an equal partnership of mutual respect, love and responsibility
(“no one is bigger than the other.”) In place of the authoritative “Christ-husband” that some
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modern Coptic authors envisage, Christina saw her marriage as a three-way relationship between
herself, her husband and God.
In particular, the images of marriage that Armanios examines in the first part of her
article emphasize that the key division between wife and husband is that the wife is responsible
for the home, and the husband is the one to bear the burden of the outside world. This does not
preclude women’s employment or women entering the public space; but wives who do so must
never neglect their guardianship of the Coptic home.

Gender and class
Christina’s social class had a major impact on her views about gender roles and on the
realities of her life as an Egyptian woman. She, like all of my upper middle class informants, was
able to enter public space without compromising her honor or her family’s respectability. She
was not subject to the confinement/protection strategies that Van Doorn-Harder describes in
Contemporary Coptic Nuns. Freedom of movement is provided by private cars, and these women
typically move through socially-segregated space that is quite geographically disparate – like my
informants who journeyed from their workplaces or their homes each week to assemble in a
private flat in Maadi for bible study.
Likewise, for Christina and her husband Amir, there was never a question of asking a
priest to find them a marriage partner. They had no need to do so because they interacted in a
social environment that was not segregated, and female virtue was not considered to be
compromised by social interaction with men. She met Amir through mutual friends, and they
spent time together getting to know each other and building a romantic relationship, before
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discussing engagement. Just as Christina had not needed a respectable excuse to leave her
house, she did not need to use church networks to find a partner.
Romantic relationships were not taboo among my informants; some had boyfriends and
many had had them in the past. The Coptic Orthodox establishment has forbidden dating, as it
may promote sexual activity, and enjoins young Coptic members to socialize in groups to avoid
temptation.000 My informants discussed the issue of class in relation to gender freedoms with me
and most argued that, in general, lower socio-economic status resulted in less freedom for
women and more “closed-minded” or “conservative” approaches to dating, to women’s clothing
and to women’s roles in general. Upper middle class women like Christina ignore warnings
against dating and relationships before marriage, as they do not conform to upper middle class
gender norms.
Christina was also encouraged to go to university and to seek out a well-paying job at a
multinational firm afterwards. She studied engineering at the American University in Cairo (a
male-dominated major, she told me) and had worked as an engineer at a major
telecommunications company. She planned to continue working at some point after the birth of
her first child.
Zaki writes as an upper middle class Coptic woman, who had connected with her
informants through a welfare program organized by her church in Heliopolis. She commented on
the differences in the participation of women in the religious life of the communities, noting that
in El Salaam, women are “recipients of the services rather than the participants” and, in contrast
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to churches in “upper class communities”, they are not allowed to give speeches to the
congregation at public meetings.001
The gender roles that Christina sought to conform to were influenced by her upper middle
class status – her interpretation of official doctrines was colored by her experiences of middle
class culture, with its expectation of how women should behave. Accordingly she expected to
work without restriction from her father or husband, and possibly to do so after having children.
She embraced some elements of the gender complementarity discourse endorsed by the church,
and found these explanations to be useful tools in helping her build a solid marriage. However,
as a member of the upper middle class, her responsibilities towards the home could be
discharged easily through hiring domestic help. The confinement/protection strategy had no
place in her life and she was able to enter the public space freely.
She had been free to socialize in mixed-gender groups, and she had made relationship
choices that she considered uncontroversial (although they were officially discouraged by the
church), by choosing her partner after a period of dating. She aspired to a marriage of mutual
love and respect, rather than one characterized by subservience or obedience.
Christina’s selective approach to official church discourse on the behavior of female
members is not purely about contestation. Her experiences suggest that the religious
establishment, or perhaps some individual churches, are also selective in how they deal with their
congregations. The religious meetings that Christina attended did not contest her lifestyle; they
did not stress that pre-marital dating was wrong and that partners should be selected through
church networks. Nor were there sessions that stressed the obligations of the virtuous wife to the
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home, above and beyond her participation in the public sphere. In fact, the meetings were led by
a priest in cooperation with two psychologists – young, educated, upper middle class women –
so they were a product not only of the church but of upper middle class culture as well.
If gender roles are interpreted selectively and through a filter of class culture by female
members of the church, it seems that the church itself tailors its approaches to fit the needs and
aspirations of an upper middle class congregation. There is some negotiation with these
privileged lay members, as the church does not seek to rigidly enforce a particular set of gender
norms.

71

Chapter 3: Contesting Faith and Discipline
This chapter examines how some of my informants contested gender norms, and how
others explicated what they viewed as unjust or erroneous beliefs about gender by associating
them with either other Christian denominations or with Islam or Middle Eastern values. It will
argue that this upper middle class group has, in most cases, freedom to change denominations
and to experiment with a variety of forms of Christian worship, and in the case of one of my
informants, this process was prompted by a dissatisfaction in what she saw as unfair and unequal
treatment based on her gender. It will argue that the symbolic capital of this group means that
young members, including young female members, have relative freedom to leave their
churches; but this spiritual freedom does not extend to conversion to Islam.
Many, perhaps most, of my female interviewees expressed some dissatisfaction with or
opposition to some part of the conservative gender ideologies in Egypt, which contrasted with
their “open-minded” attitudes. They consistently attributed practices and beliefs on gender that
they viewed negatively to the impact of either Islamic or “Eastern” culture. These practices or
beliefs, even when practiced by Christians or endorsed by Christian churches, were never
considered to be valid religious interpretations. Rather, those who practiced them were
religiously mistaken, according to my informants.
Protestant and Catholic informants also applied this othering process to the Coptic
church; when confronted by ‘closed-minded’ approaches to gender, these approaches could be
labeled a result of contamination from the Coptic Orthodox church (itself exposed to the
corruptive influence of Islam or Middle Eastern culture).
Dina, the Protestant physician from Maadi, told me that:
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Being a Christian, makes you have more of the Western culture; you’re not, like
very Eastern, you don’t have this mentality. I mean, I have guy friends...The
Orthodox church, some of them have this mentality of, Eastern mentality, it’s
more… they have Sunday school after …y’anni, massalan like 00, 00. They start
separating guys from girls. It was not like that at Protestant church. So all my life
I was with guys, so it’s okay for me to have guy friends and to go out with them
for coffee.
In Dina’s view, Christianity is associated with a “Western” mentality, and Protestant
Christianity better embodies this than the Coptic Orthodox church. To define this Western
mentality, she discusses gender roles – specifically gender segregation.

Dina also explained that this Western/Eastern element was affected by class:
In Maadi, I mean even my friends who go to St Mark’s Church, it’s an Orthodox
church, but they have a different mentality, different than St Marks’ in Shubra 004
for example. They are open minded. No separation between girls and guys, they
go out as a group, so it’s about bardu the place. So Maadi, Masr El-Gedida
[Heliopolis], Zamalek - these churches are different, but Shubra for example,
Alexandria, they are very strict, they are very eastern, they have some of the
Islamic culture.

I asked her to tell me more about the topic and she explained the difference in terms of
dress.
They won’t wear kida [pointing to her own bare upper arms] I mean, some of the
Christians would rather have short sleeves, but like this [she indicated her elbow].
They wouldn’t wear kida, they wouldn’t wear leggings, they wouldn’t wear um,
swimming suits, some of them….In Shubra, I’m not talking Maadi of course.
In Dina’s view, the Coptic Orthodox Church had a more “closed-minded” approach to
gender, a product of its Islamic and Eastern environment, but her Orthodox friends from Maadi
and from other upper middle class areas were able to resist this conservatism. Clearly Dina finds
it hard to articulate the precise boundaries of class and religion when describing different
004

Shubra is a middle class suburb in Cairo with a high proportion of Coptic Orthodox Christians. It is considered
less affluent than areas like Mohandeseen, Heliopolis and Maadi.
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attitudes to gender; although she attributes more conservative attitudes to dress etc. to religion,
she also acknowledges that class (being from “Maadi” and not “Shubra”) outweighs these
religious differences.002
I was passed Salma’s details by a friend who knew that I was looking to interview
Christian women. Salma had a friendly manner and she talked animatedly. She was a 09-yearold university student, who had been educated in a French language Catholic school. She had
grown up in a Coptic Catholic family, and continued to attend the French-speaking Catholic
mass, in memory of her father who used to take her to church with him and who had recently
passed away. She also, however, attended services at Qasr Dobara Evangelical Church.
Like Dina, Salma described a relationship between the Coptic Church, Eastern culture,
class and conservative gender attitudes. She told me that: “the Orthodox are less open-minded,”
compared with Protestants and Catholics, but that Catholic churches in “poor areas” are closedminded and that the Orthodox church in Masr El-Gedida [Heliopolis] was more open-minded.
Many of her Coptic friends would dress conservatively, unlike her:
They don't often wear shorts. I wear them if they are taking me with the car. And
when I'm on vacation, I wear a mayo [swimsuit]; I don't wear a bikini because I
have a bad body, but I would wear one if I was in shape. But my friends wear
shorts under the mayo.

The minority of the minority
Nadine, also a university student, was introduced to me by Salma. I initially spent some
time socializing with the two of them in a mixed-gender, mixed-religion group. Salma was
anxious to point out to me a Muslim friend of hers who she had until recently been dating; she
had ended the relationship because she felt that he was too conservative and controlling.
002

My perspective as a researcher is that class culture, not religion, typically defines this group’s attitudes to dress,
segregation, dating, etc, but my informants often intertwined the two as Dina does here, talking about Coptic
Orthodox members from Shubra who belong to both a different denomination and a different class.
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I felt both Salma and Nadine looked at me somewhat differently from my other
informants. The six or seven year age gap between us seemed to create something of an aura of
confession and supportive friendship. As with all my interviewees, I introduced the topic of my
research as broadly as possible (Christian women and gender roles in Egypt) to create an openended conversation for my informants to respond according to their own interpretation. Nadine
and Salma were the only interviewees who discussed these issues in a framework of justice.
Salma talked about the problems in her relationships caused by Egyptian men (both Muslim and
Christian) who were overly controlling, and her frustrating encounters with male friends and
colleagues who considered themselves superior to her because she was a woman. Bearing in
mind Abu-Lughod’s warning against romanticizing resistance004 and framing answers according
to a Western feminist typology, I generally tried to avoid questions or lines of enquiry in
interviews that framed the issues in reference to power, resistance, rights and so on. But Salma
herself wanted to discuss with me her frustration about how women were unjustly treated in
Egyptian culture, and her struggle against “closed-minded” people and men who tried to control
her. At one point, she told me that she was interested in “women’s rights” and wanted to work in
the field one day.
Nadine struck me as serious and perhaps slightly reserved when I first met her. I had
joined Salma and some of her friends at a pub in Zamalek. As others continued to talk amongst
themselves, Salma moved the chairs around and invited Nadine to sit with us as a trio. Nadine,
on learning that I was researching Christian women in Egypt, lit a cigarette and told me that she
would definitely like to speak to me about her experiences being what she called “being the
minority of the minority.”
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I encountered many informants who were generous with their time, and took it as a
responsibility to assist me in my research. But Nadine and Salma were different in that they were
both genuinely interested in the possibility of a discussion, and during my interviews with them,
they both asked me questions about my opinions on the topic of women and power.
Nadine was equally serious when I met her at a coffee shop in downtown Cairo for an
interview. She had driven herself from Maadi, where she lived with her family. We sat in the
smoking section and she lit a cigarette, and we started to talk. Just like Salma, she told me that
the people in her church – the Orthodox – were “less open-minded”. Men were allowed to
smoke, but girls were not. “It’s Egypt,” she said.
Nadine was unhappy with a recent experience at her church. She told me that she had
“almost been kicked out for talking to guys.” During the breaks in the igtimaa’ (religious
meeting), she would go out and talk to the male servants. “Someone would come to say hi, ask
me about my father” and they would chat, and she had begun to be the subject of gossip because
of her conversations with the male servants. She seemed to find the hypocrisy of the situation
frustrating. “They don’t think it’s proper at church to talk to guys, but then, the servants who
talk about us, they’re the ones who eventually date my friends.” She told me that it was “more
important when you’re a girl, how people talk about you,” whereas “everything's acceptable for
guys.”
Nadine’s church seemed to have enforced a more strict gender code than some of the
other churches described by my informants. This code also extended to socialization with
Muslims. A priest had approached Nadine and summoned her to confession. “He told me…
people are saying stuff about you in church, so I want you to come.” After hearing her confess,
he spoke to her about reports that she had been seen with Muslims:
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He said ‘you’re going out with Muslims, you have a Muslim group,’ and I said
yeah, we don’t discuss religion; religion is private. And he said, eventually you
will convert, you’ll do bad stuff. He said he had his own statistics of the
percentage of Muslims who smoke…like 94 percent to 4 percent of Christians.”
She laughed a little. “He’s supposed to be someone who really gets it…gets
what’s going on…because he has to give good advice…And he said it’s not
acceptable, because they want you to come to the religion...They have the concept
of numbers. They want bigger numbers. In some ways it’s true, but you cannot
judge a person according to that.

After this encounter, Nadine left her church. She said that no one at the church wanted to
talk to her, because of her bad reputation. The same thing happened to five other girls who used
to socialize with groups of Muslims friends. “No one really accepted us. One of them, she stayed
home, and she said, ‘I’m not going to churches.’ And I went to a different church.”
Nadine chose to start attending a Catholic church. She had attended a variety of different
churches during a period spent in the USA, and had particularly liked an “American” [Protestant]
church. But she felt that attending a Protestant church would be too provocative. “If I go there,
everyone’s going to gossip.” And she told me that she liked the fact that the Catholic church
shared similar kinds of rituals to the Coptic church.
Her experience at the Egyptian Catholic church was radically different from that of her
Coptic church. “When I go into church, during the mass … everyone turns around to look at you,
look at what you’re wearing..everything...but when I went to the Catholic church, I go in and I
walk all the way to the front rows, without being stared at.”
The priest treated her differently. “I went to confess, and I said I smoke…I had alcohol,
and the priest said, it’s alright, everyone has their own mistakes. Smoking is just like having the
bad habit of needing coffee in the morning. It’s just a psychological addiction. It has nothing to
do with sex.” The priest had provided Nadine with the kind of support and acceptance that she
had found lacking at her Coptic church.
77

Her sister had told her a story about Pastor Sameh of Qasr Dobara Evangelical Church,
which she repeated to me. He had given a lecture on homosexuality, and he said that “it’s fine to
be like that…if that’s how God made you…it’s the same as if you have an affair, if you’re
straight and you have an affair…it’s the same as being gay.” The Protestant churches were
“open-minded. They accept new things.”
I asked Nadine how her parents had responded to her changing religious choices. She
had been reluctant to tell her father (her mother had passed away three years ago) the extent of
her problems at the Coptic church, because she was worried he would overreact and start
arguments, worried that she was being talked about. He told Nadine that she could attend
Catholic services but could not convert, and although she argued with him that it was “still
Christianity”, he was strict on this point.
Her father was not “conservative” but was very conscious of “how people look at you,”,
for example permitting Nadine to smoke at home, but not in the public space.
Nadine had challenged some of the practices that her particular church enforced. She had
rejected the gender segregation that the church hierarchy and her church congregation attempted
to enforce, because she did not agree with it. She argued that it was a product of a conservative
mentality.
She told me about another incident which highlighted, to her, the frustrating attitude of
her old church community. Several years ago, she and a friend had applied to become servers in
church. “I went there and filled the application and four days later, they came to me and my
friend, and they said no… they didn't tell us the reason. We insisted on knowing and the guy
eventually said, ‘we saw you eating chicken on a Friday. How can you be a servant when you do
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not fast?’ ” 008 The comment was “ridiculous”; and it characterized the kind of intrusive
judgementalism that she found unjust and spiritually and emotionally unsatisfying.
Like Dina and Salma, Nadine linked this attitude, and the unfair treatment of girls in
comparison to boys (“No one ever talks about the guys,”) to the Coptic Orthodox Church’s
“conservatism” “strictness” and “closed-mindedness” which was linked to its contact with
Eastern culture and with Islam.
She recalled a meeting with a Coptic nun, who had asked her if she smoked and “I said
yes; she said, it's okay, we all make mistakes.” Nuns may be less judgmental, she thought,
because they were relatively insulated from Egyptian culture.

Changing denomination
Nadine was not the only interviewee I spoke to who was raised in one church but
regularly attended services somewhere else. Salma now split her time between Qasr Dobara,
where she had friends and felt comfortable, and mass at the Catholic church that her father used
to take her to. Youssef, the leader of the bible study group, was born into an observant Coptic
Orthodox family and now was more comfortable describing himself as a “follower of Christ”.
Irene, who described her faith as a personal relationship with God and was reluctantly to define
herself by denomination,009 was raised Catholic, and her mother had been born Coptic Orthodox
but had converted for marriage. Both Dina’s parents were practicing Protestants, but both had
been baptized in the Coptic Orthodox church and then converted.

008

Coptic Orthodox members are expected to abstain from meat and dairy products on every Wednesday and Friday,
excluding Pentecost season.
009
Although I would situate Irene and Youssef’s refusal to favor a particular church within a broadly evangelical
Protestant tradition that emphasizes an individualistic spiritual relationship with God.
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Although there are constraints on conversion, particularly from parents and families who
were uncomfortable with spiritual exploration (Youssef and Nadine’s parents fall into this
category), these young upper middle class Christians have considerable freedom to reshape
religious identities based on their personal choices. 002
However, this denominational flexibility does not extend to leaving Christianity and
becoming Muslim. Legally, Christians are able to do so in Egypt, but this possibility was not
discussed by my informants and none expressed any interest in experimentation with Islam.000 A
few touched on the topic of mixed marriages. Dina said that she knew many Muslim-Christian
couples during her time at university, but that none she knew of had ever chosen to marry. In
fact, mixed marriages were most common among the “lower classes”. She had heard many
stories of poor Coptic women being convinced to marry Muslim men “because they’re not very
religious; they care for things more than religion, like just the basics. Love and food and a place
to live.”
Although the line between different Christian denominations and identities was very
fluid, the dividing line between Christian and Muslim was, in the imaginations of my informants,
unbreachable. While the increasing emphasis on Coptic identity in Egypt has not prevented
young upper middle Copts from looking outside the Coptic community for alternative spiritual
experiences, the Christian-Muslim binary remains absolute in the lives of these upper middle
class Christians.

002

Protestantism was considered particularly problematic by many of my interviewees; Nadine chose to attend a
Catholic rather than a Protestant church partly because this would provoke less gossip. Christina told me that she
would have considered marrying a Catholic partner but probably a Protestant would have been difficult because
Protestantism is “very different.”
000
An interesting contrast with the high number of conversions Zaki recorded in her thesis.
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Conclusion

This thesis has argued that class identity and class privileges play a role in the way
affluent Christian women interpret gender roles and religious identities.
My informants were part of an urban upper middle class, defined by shared transnational
and educational experiences, and by the physical segregation of different socio-economic classes
in Egypt. Socio-economic divisions are reproduced starkly in the lived realities of members of
the upper middle class, through the geography of their urban lives.
Suburban developments, private education, exclusive leisure spaces, private transport,
are all isolating elements that ensure that extended, meaningful social contact with people from
different socio-economic backgrounds is limited. Members of this group possess a
“cosmopolitan capital” which is constituted largely in social, cultural, educational and linguistic
terms, and which sets them apart from the broader middle class. In this way, the economic power
of this group is reproduced culturally through the maintenance of a particular class culture.
One of the ways that this class culture is produced is through gender ideologies that use
terms like “open minded” and “educated” to distinguish the upper middle class from other socioeconomic groups that enforce different gender norms. Use of these value judgments conceals
economic privilege behind perceived cultural or moral superiority.
This class culture allowed my Coptic Orthodox informants to selectively reinterpret
church teachings and other popular discourses about gender. Their rejection of teachings that
were not compatible with the kind of gender norms practiced within the upper middle class (for
example, mixed gender friendships, and romantic relationships prior to engagement) was
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formulated as a rejection of “closed-minded” or “conservative” thinking – not of Christian
doctrine.
This selective appropriation of ideas about gender was mirrored by a degree of selectivity
by some elements of the Coptic religious establishment. Some priests seem to have more “strict”
interpretations of certain teachings than others.000 Christina’s church in Zamalek seemed to
provide interpretations of official doctrines that would appeal to its upper middle congregation –
in contrast to Nadine’s experience of frustration at being judged by her church community and
priest for associating with Muslims and for talking to male friends in church.
That my informants seem able either to avoid elements of church teaching that are
incompatible with their lifestyles (Christina) or to challenge community and clerical authority by
seeking out religious environments that they found more emotionally and spiritually satisfying
(Nadine) suggests that they are not part of the same “imagined Coptic community” that has come
to define the middle class Coptic experience. They feel a stronger sense of community and
belonging with other upper middle class Egyptians from different religious backgrounds than
with fellow Copts from the less affluent families.
Within the upper middle class, it seems that the bounded, inward-looking nature of neoCoptic identity does not have the same power; instead, the Christian community is constituted
around a common Christian identity, rather than around a common Coptic Orthodox identity.
Denominational divisions are observed but do not seem to be rigid social barriers. Religious
exploration, within Christianity, is socially acceptable, and in many cases does not provoke
sanction or criticism. Interestingly, despite this denomination fluidity, the Christian-Muslim

000

Zaki suggests that churches in poorer areas exclude their female members from some kinds of participation.
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binary remains absolute. Christian-Muslim marriages among my informants’ social circles were
reported to be extremely rare. Likewise, my informants’ spiritual exploration was always within
the boundaries of Christianity. None of my informants were interested in Islam as a possible
spiritual alternative. This suggests to me that, whilst the power of the Coptic Church to police the
community is somewhat weaker among upper middle class members, the wider division in
Egyptian society –the Christian/Muslim binary – still retains its power. My informants’
‘cosmopolitan capital’, which had displaced or muted the power of a bounded Coptic Orthodox
community, did not have any impact on their identification as Christian.
Overall, my research suggests that class remains an important factor for determining the
religious identities and gender roles of upper middle class Coptic women. My informants’ power
to select, interpret, reject and reformulate certain elements of expected gender roles seems to be a
reflection of the power of upper middle class culture. However, it should be noted that this power
is not unlimited; there are non-negotiable issues, particularly access to divorce, where the
church’s teachings are enforced and policed. The power to define and limit divorce rests with
clerical authorities and attempts to contest this are resisted and disciplined by the church, even
when such contestation comes from upper middle class members.
This thesis also emphasizes the importance of gender as a site of identity production; just
as the rural poor use gender symbols such as female genital cutting to articulate group
so members of the urban middle class evaluate symbols and behaviors such as female dress,
dating, and mixed-gender friendships to define the boundaries of their class community and
locate others in a particular class framework.

000

Yount, 0221, 0280.
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Epilogue
The majority of the fieldwork that comprised this thesis was carried out prior to the
revolution that erupted in January 0200. However, these dramatic events and the complex
political restructuring that followed them and is still unfolding are worth reflecting on, because
they have implications for some of the ideas explored in this thesis.
One key observation about the post-Mubarak era is the extent to which the status of
Egypt’s Coptic Christians remains a fraught, controversial and emotive issue. Despite initial
hopes that the popular uprising would mark a turning point towards a more inclusive national
citizenship, the months following the handover of power to the supreme military council were
marked by frequent outbreaks of sectarian violence.
A new development, however, was the nature and scale of the Coptic response to this
reemergence of sectarian tension. The political changes brought about by the uprising also lead
to an opening up of space for political debate and participation. Critics of powerful actors are
now more easily heard, and there is much greater space for all kinds of political action.001 As a
result, there has been an emergence of a large number of new political campaigns, associations
and parties, among them a number of Coptic advocacy groups.
Samer Soliman discusses what he describes as a new element in Coptic activism
emerging at a demonstration in 0222, when Coptic protesters at the funeral of a Christian victim
of an apparently religiously-motivated murder took their protest onto the street, rather than in or

001

Of course, powerful limits on freedom of speech and political action still exist, and various kinds of opposition
are still regularly met by state sanctioned oppression, sometimes including deadly violence. Nonetheless, the public
space is manifestly more open now than under Hosni Mubarak’s regime in many key ways.
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around the Orthodox Coptic cathedral.004 This new kind of Coptic mobilization – as citizens who
are demanding equal rights from the state, rather than as members of the Church seeking either
to defend it or to be protected by it – is has become much more common in the relative openness
of the political scene after the events of January 0200. Coptic groups like the Maspero Youth
Union and Copts for Egypt which lobby for religious freedom and for Coptic interests were
formed largely by young “revolutionary” Christian youth. These young middle class Christians
took part in the January/February 0200 protests to oust Mubarak,002 and in the aftermath of
political transition, as sectarian violence continued to occur and responses were seen as
inadequate, the issue of the status and rights of Coptic Egyptians came to the surface again,
leading to the formation of these groups.
They stand in contrast, and sometimes explicit opposition, to the official church hierarchy
on political issues. The policy of the Coptic Orthodox Church during the January/February
events was to stand fast to its pro-regime policy, and Pope Shenouda explicitly condemned the
protests and urged Copts not to take part. Observing events in Mohandeseen, a center of ‘proMubarak’ support, I witnessed several protests in support of the regime in February 0200 at
which contingents of Coptic priests marched through the streets in their distinctive dress, holding
aloft pro-Mubarak banners. Following the exit of Mubarak and the transition to rule by military
junta, the Church has generally maintained its policy of support for the regime and the status
quo, although explicit criticism of protesters became less evident after it was clear that the
uprising had captured popular imagination and would have a lasting impact.

004
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Soliman, 012-4.
Interview with Maspero Youth Union member F., October 2011.
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The Maspero Youth Union, by contrast, was formed by self-described ‘revolutionary
youth’ and continues to lobby and mobilize in favor of broader ‘revolutionary’ goals, for
example attending anti-military council protests along with mainstream revolutionary groups. It
also has at times explicitly criticized the pro-regime stance of the church hierarchy, for example
in December 0200 when the group criticizing the invitation of military council members to
celebrate Christmas in the Cathedral.004
Other voices have also been heard in the new political space, including Coptic groups
lobbying the Church to change its strict policy on divorce. These campaigns constitute direct
challenges to clerical authority, and in some cases these were met with a small-scale version of
the violence that the Egyptian state deployed to silence its own challengers. Just as the Mubarak
regime had deployed paid “thugs” (criminal elements hired to use violent tactics to disperse
opposition) during the “Battle of the Camel” in Tahrir Square, so the Church, according to its
critics, seemed to have hired thugs with a dog to violently intimidate a small group of protesters
demanding their voice be heard outside the cathedral. Policemen on the scene refused to
intervene as violence broke out “insisting it was a purely Coptic affair.008
These kind of developments show that the categories and models that this thesis began by
scrutinizing have not been swept away in the post-Mubarak period, but rather, form an
important part of a dynamic and fluctuating political culture. New battles between lay and
clerical elites seem likely to take place, and new modes of political expression are emerging
which will have powerful impacts on the elements of Coptic identity and minoritarian discourse
discussed above. The issue of access to divorce is creating direct and public confrontations
004

Jadaliyya, “Copts Protest Church's Christmas Invitation to SCAF and Islamists”, December 02, 0200.
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/0809/copts-protest-churchs-christmas-invitation-to-scaf
008
Rasha Sadek, “Stalemate” Al-Ahram Weekly, August 1, 0200. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/020090249/eg4.htm
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between lay and clerical elites over key questions of whether the authority for such issues should
be clerical or civil. The “entente” relationship between state and church may also be
reformulated as new political actors gain power, a new pope occupies the See, and perhaps as
young, middle class Coptic activists, who bring to the struggle a “revolutionary” experience,
seek to change the status quo. Sectarian violence is another factor which will surely have an
impact on Coptic identity, as will the sense of state persecution engendered firstly by a persistent
failure to bring perpetrators of violent acts to justice, and secondly – critically – by the
experience of brutal state repression on 9 October 0200, when a peaceful protest against the
burning of a Coptic community center was attacked by the army, leaving 04 protesters dead.
Ideas about gender continue to be important for constructing group identity in this
transition period; public protests about rights to divorce and possible changes in personal status
laws have reemerged as part of a lay contestation of the clerical hierarchy’s control. The stories
of “kidnapped women” are frequent, suggesting community struggles over female members. The
Maspero Youth Union, in the opening lines of a statement to newly elected parliament members,
demonstrated the extent to which gender remains an important faultline for defining group
identities:
Gentlemen of the majority in the parliament, we address you with all respect. Will
you rule us according to law or will you deal with us as a minority and Christians,
and how will you deal with our women and how you will see their faces and their
uncovered hair?” 009

009

Mohamed Abdel Salam, “Egypt’s Maspero Youth questions Islamist parliamentary majority over Christians”
Bikya Masr, January 09, 0200. http://bikyamasr.com/41094/egypts-maspero-youth-questions-islamistparliamentary-majority-over-christians/
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Although it is still unclear what long-term effects the unprecedented political
changes of 0200 will have on the Egyptian Coptic community, it seems likely that the
kind of themes analysed above, such as the minoritarian trend, the competition between
lay and clerical elites, the “entente” between church and state, the impact of class on
categories of religious identity, and the importance of gender as a space of symbolic
politics will remain relevant.
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